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(Re)Conceptualizing Insider Trading
UNITED STATES V. NEWMAN AND THE INTENT TO
DEFRAUD
J. Kelly Strader†
INTRODUCTION
Recent insider trading enforcement efforts have been
unparalleled in their scope and impact,1 producing the lengthiest
insider trading sentences in history2 and pushing the boundaries
of existing law.3 Largely because of these efforts, insider trading
† © J. Kelly Strader. Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School, Los Angeles;
J.D., University of Virginia School of Law; M.I.A., Columbia University; A.B., College of
William & Mary. Thanks to the participants at the White Collar Crime Roundtable at the
Southeastern Association of Law Schools 2013 Annual Meeting for their input, and to
Samuel Buell, Michael Dorff, Lisa Kern Griffin, Warren Grimes, and Sung Hui Kim for
their extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to Geoffrey Cleveland, Scott
Savage, and Mary (“Nikki”) Kaasa for their research assistance.
1 For example, the insider trading cases arising from the investigation of
hedge fund giant SAC Capital Investors LP (“SAC”) are some of the largest and most
complex ever prosecuted. See Patricia Hurtado et al., SAC Record $1.8 Billion Plea Caps
Seven-Year Insider Trading Probe, 9 White Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) No. 242, at 1 (Apr.
18, 2014); Bob Van Voris, Portfolio Manager Martoma Found Guilty in Massive Insider
Trading Scheme at Hedge Funds, 9 White Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 106 (Feb.
10, 2014). The prosecutor leading the efforts had an extraordinary success record until
recent events. See Matthew Goldstein et al., A Winning Streak on Insider Cases Ends,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2014, at B1, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/jury-
clears-rengan-rajaratnam-in-insider-trading-case.
2 Raj Rajaratnam, a former hedge fund manager, was convicted of 14 counts
of conspiracy and securities fraud based upon an insider trading scheme. He was
sentenced to 11 years in prison, the longest insider trading prison sentence in history,
and assessed over $150 million in criminal and civil penalties. Peter Lattman, Galleon
Chief Sentenced to 11-Year Term in Insider Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2011, 11:18
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/rajaratnam-is-sentenced-to-11-years; Peter
Lattman, Rajaratnam Ordered to Pay $92.8 Million Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2011,
6:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/rajaratnam-ordered-to-pay-92-8-million-
penalty/#main; see United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d. Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 2820 (2014). Although sentences vary widely under the discretionary federal
sentencing guidelines, the statutory maximum for insider trading is 20 years for each
count and fines of up to $5 million for individuals and $25 million for organizations. 15
U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 77ff, 78ff (2012). In white collar cases, the sentences are often driven
up dramatically by the amount of loss. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2B1.1 (2014).
3 See infra Parts I & II.
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law and policy could well be on the brink of substantial
transformation. In what is potentially a landmark decision, the
Second Circuit in United States v. Newman4 sought to clarify
insider trading law. In particular, the decision takes a major step
in returning insider trading doctrine to its core concept: because
insider trading liability is grounded in the specific intent crime of
common law fraud, such liability requires both a breach of duty
and intentional behavior with respect to that breach.
The Newman decision arose within the context of a series
of Second Circuit insider trading decisions that applied conflicting
mens rea standards governing core culpability elements of the
offense, particularly with respect to tipper/tippee liability.5 These
cases raise issues that have the potential to reshape insider trading
law and that ultimately must be decided by the United States
Supreme Court.6 It is within this context that this article re-
conceptualizes and systematizes insider trading law as grounded
within and defined by the common law theft crime of fraud.
To understand the expansiveness of current law, consider
the case against Anthony Chiasson, Todd Newman’s co-
defendant. Both were hedge fund portfolio managers.7 Each was
convicted of multiple counts in an alleged insider trading
scheme; Chiasson was sentenced to six and a half years and
Newman to four and a half years in prison.8
In the case against Chiasson, the alleged original tipper
worked in Dell Inc.’s investor relations department, and leaked
advance information about a Dell financial performance report.
Chiasson received the information as a fourth-level tippee after
4 United States v. Newman, 773 F. 3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc denied,
2015 WL 1954058 (2d Cir. Apr. 3, 2015). The government moved for rehearing, which the
Second Circuit denied. Id. See Phyllis Diamond, U.S. Focuses on Personal Benefit in Bid for
Rehearing of Insider Ruling, 10 White Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 75. (Feb. 6, 2015)
[hereinafter Diamond, Personal Benefit]; Matthew Goldstein & Ben Protess, Court
Rejects Bharara’s Plea to Reconsider Insider Trading Ruling, N.Y. TIMESDEALBOOK (Apr. 3,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/business/dealbook/appeals-court-rejects-request-
to-rehear-landmark-insider-trading-case.html. As this Article goes to press, the government
is considering whether to seek review by the United States Supreme Court. See id.
5 See Robert J. Anello & Richard F. Albert, Second Circuit to Resolve Split on
Insider Trading, 250 N.Y.L.J. No. 107 (Dec. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Anello & Albert,
Resolve] (noting conflicting standards for tippee liability).
6 See Yin Wilczek, Insider Trader’s Second Circuit Appeal Could Lead to
Evolution of Law, Lawyers Say, 8 White Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 666 (Sept.
17, 2013). The government’s 133-page brief in one of these cases shows that the
government recognizes the high stakes in the case’s potential for defining insider trading
law—particularly with respect to a tippee’s mens rea. See Brief for United States of
America, United States v. Horvath, 2013 WL 6163307, at *41 (2d Cir. Nov. 14, 2013)
(Nos. 13-1837, 13-1917).
7 Newman, 773 F.3d at 442.
8 Id. at 444.
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it had been passed through intermediaries. At trial, the
government did not show that Chiasson knew the identity of the
person who tipped him or that he knew whether the tipper had
obtained the information improperly.9 In such circumstances,
can a tippee be held criminally liable for trading on the
information? The trial court in Chiasson’s case said yes, while
other courts have said no.10
In reversing Newman’s and Chiasson’s insider trading
convictions, the Second Circuit attempted to clarify the inconsistent
Second Circuit precedent. Most importantly, the court held that
the trial court had used improper jury instructions that omitted
core mens rea elements for tippee liability.11 The court also took
the extraordinary step of finding the evidence against the
defendants insufficient as a matter of law, thus foreclosing the
possibility of a retrial.12
As one commentator aptly noted, the Newman case
“addresses ‘very directly’ and ‘very starkly’ the eroding legal
distinction between the permissible sharing of information, and the
illegal use of material nonpublic information.”13 In its opinion, the
Second Circuit made this very point, criticizing the “doctrinal
novelty” of the prosecution and noting that it could locate no other
criminal convictions of such remote tippees.14 In this light,
Newman is “a potentially game-changing decision”15 that signals
long-overdue resistance to the government’s boundary-pushing
insider trading prosecutions.16
And Newman may be part of a broader pushback.17 In
another high profile case, the trial judge dismissed the principal
9 Id. at 443. Under Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983), a tipper acts
improperly only when the tipper acts for personal gain. In Chiasson, the trial court did
not require that the jury find that Chiasson, the tipper, knew that the tipper was
acting improperly, i.e., for personal gain.
10 See Anello & Albert, Resolve, supra note 5.
11 Newman, 773 F.3d at 450-51.
12 Id. at 12-14 (dismissing the case with prejudice).
13 Wilczek, supra note 6, quoting securities law expert Martin Klotz.
14 Newman, 773 F.3d at 448.
15 Phyllis Diamond & Hugh B. Kaplan, Second Circuit Makes Insider Trading
Hard to Prove When Trader Is Steps Removed from Insider, 96 Criminal Law Rep.
(BNA) No. 12 at 292 (Dec. 17, 2014) (quoting former SEC attorney Michael MacPhail).
16 See Peter J. Henning, What an Appeals Court Insider Trading Decision Does,
and Doesn’t, Do, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/12/10/what-an-appeals-court-insider-trading-decision-does-and-doesnt-do/ (“The
ruling represents the first significant appellate decision in a number of years that curtails
the scope of insider trading laws.”); see also Patricia Hurtado, Bharara Fenced in by Ruling
Undercutting Insider Trading Convictions, 9 White Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 906
(Dec. 16, 2014) (describing the praise and criticism that the decision has earned).
17 See Patricia Hurtado & Robert Wilhelm, Second Circuit Questions Insider
Trading Jury Instructions, 9 White Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 278 (May 2,
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insider trading charges and the jury acquitted the defendant on
the remaining charge.18 As the New York Times noted, this case
“underscored a broader whiff of skepticism about the crackdown
on insider trading.”19 And in the high profile civil case that the
SEC brought against Nelson Obus, the jury found Obus and his
co-defendants not liable.20 A number of other insider trading
prosecutions and convictions may also be in jeopardy.21
In this highly charged regulatory environment, insider
trading law is in dire need of reform. Because insider trading is
a form of securities fraud that is primarily judicially-defined,22
the crime requires proof of elements that are often vague and ill-
defined, particularly with respect to the mens rea element(s).23
This vagueness raises two basic due process concerns: denying
potential defendants fair notice and emboldening prosecutors to
push the law beyond established boundaries.24
2014); Leah McGrath Goodman, Why Rengan Rajaratnam Got Off on Insider Trading
Charges, NEWSWEEK, July 9, 2014, http://www.newsweek.com/why-rengan-rajaratnam-
got-insider-trading-charges-258005.
18 The acquittal was of Rengan Rajaratnam, the brother of Raj Rajaratnam.
Goodman, supra note 17.
19 Goldstein et al., supra note 1, at B1.
20 Rachel Abrams, After Fighting Insider Trading Charges for 10 Years, a Fund
Manager Is Cleared, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 30, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/05/30/fund-manager-found-not-liable-in-insider-trading-case/.
21 See Phyllis Diamond, Second Circuit’s Ruling Clarified Bright-Line Rule,
Chiasson Lawyer Says, 10 White Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 23 (Jan. 9, 2015).
22 Robert J. Anello & Richard F. Albert, Revisiting Criminal Insider Trading
Liability, N.Y. L.J. June 3, 2014, at 2 [hereinafter Anello & Albert, Revisiting] (“Illegal
insider trading is not defined by statute, but by an amalgamation of judicial opinions.”).
23 See Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 556
(2011) [hereinafter Buell, Securities Fraud] (“The Supreme Court has never identified
the scienter required for a criminal conviction for securities fraud. The lower federal
courts have issued dozens of opinions making a mess of the matter.”); Michael L.
Seigel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis For Securities-Related Offenses, 2006
WIS. L. REV 1563, 1624 (2006) (“[T]he failure of commentators and courts to tackle
mens rea analysis head-on has resulted in lasting incoherence in the law” of securities
fraud.); Carol B. Swanson, Insider Trading Madness: Rule 10b5-1 and the Death of
Scienter, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 147, 150 (2003) (“The scienter concept . . . appears to be
slipping away” from insider trading law.). For an analysis of the vague boundaries of
securities fraud in general, see generally Peter J. Henning, Testing The Limits of
Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow
Prosecutors To Go?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 405 (1993) and Ellen S. Podgor, Jose Padilla
and Martha Stewart: Who Should Be Charged with Criminal Conduct?, 109 PENN ST.
L. REV. 1059 (2005); J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment: Reflections
on Michael, Martha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 49 (2007)
[hereinafter Strader, White Collar Crime].
24 Because most insider trading cases, like other categories of federal
criminal cases, settle without any trial, the boundary-pushing theories are rarely
tested in court or otherwise subject to review. See Lucian E. Dervan, White Collar
Overcriminalization: Deterrence, Plea Bargaining, and the Loss of Innocence, 101 KY.
L.J. 723, 744 (2013) (almost 97 percent of federal criminal cases are resolved by plea
bargain). As a result, “[n]ovel legal theories and overly-broad statutes [are] tools
merely for posturing during charge and sentence bargaining,” and are rarely “defended
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The expanding scope of insider trading law is also
emblematic of two widely-criticized phenomena in federal
criminal law, eroding mens rea standards and the over-
criminalization of activities more appropriately left to civil and
regulatory enforcement.25 By seeking to define the mens rea of
insider trading liability more carefully, the approach that this
article proposes meets many of the concerns arising from
overcriminalization. Insider trading exists in what the United
States Supreme Court termed “the gray zone” between socially
desirable and undesirable business conduct.26 As the Court has
noted in the particular context of tipper/tippee liability, it is the
job of market analysts aggressively to seek out generally
unavailable market information.27
For that reason, insider trading as a form of securities
fraud provides a particularly fertile context for examining laws
and regulations that purport to define the “gray zone.” As
Second Circuit Judge Barrington Parker commented during the
oral argument in Newman, “We sit in the financial capital of
the world . . . . [The government’s approach] gives precious
little guidance to all the institutions, all the hedge funds, that
are trying to come up with some bright line rule of what they
can and can’t do.”28
By infusing insider trading doctrine with the law and
policy of common law fraud, we can more clearly define the crime
and conform it to its core policy goals. The United States Supreme
Court has provided the groundwork for this framing in 30 years of
insider trading precedent. This theoretical underpinning has been
subject to substantial criticism, and is not always applied
and affirmed both morally and legally at trial.” Id. See also Strader, White Collar
Crime, supra note 23, at 53. Further, cases that settle, whether through consent
decrees, plea bargains, or deferred—or non-prosecution agreements, themselves
become a sort of internal precedent that then may lead to ever broader application of
the insider trading laws. See, e.g., Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J.
1135 (2004); Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
515 (2000); Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998).
25 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Playing with the Rules: An Effort to Strengthen
the Mens Rea Standards of Federal Criminal Laws, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 685, 685
(2011) [hereinafter Moohr, Playing] (“Mens rea standards have eroded over time,
making people subject to punishment who would not otherwise be blameworthy in the
classic criminal law sense. In this way, the diminished significance of the mens rea
element is part of the trend to overcriminalize.”); Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of
Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U.
L. REV. 747, 748 (2005); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 703, 743-44 (2005).
26 United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 (1978).
27 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
28 Hurtado &Wilhelm, supra note 17 (quoting Judge Barrington D. Parker Jr.).
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consistently.29 Nonetheless, until Congress decides to define
insider trading, or until the Supreme Court decides to overturn
over three decades of its own precedent, the common law of fraud
will continue to provide the governing doctrinal framework. The
Newman decision is one important step in re-conceptualizing
insider trading as a form of common law fraud.
When a party who owes a fiduciary duty or its equivalent
to the information’s owner takes and trades on the information
without disclosing the theft to the owner, that party breaches a
duty to the owner and commits illegal insider trading.30 As the
Supreme Court has consistently emphasized, it is the duty
element that serves to cabin the scope of potential insider trading
liability.31 Absent this limitation, a person who innocently
possessed and traded on the information could nonetheless be
convicted of a crime.
All the elements of insider trading, then, should be re-
conceptualized in accordance with these foundational principles. In
mens rea terms, fraud is a common law offense that requires proof
of “specific intent”; fraud cannot be committed by recklessness or
other forms of non-intentional behavior.32 To commit insider
trading—a form of securities fraud—the defendant must act
29 For insightful critiques of current insider trading doctrine, and proposals
for new theories of insider trading, see generally Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as
Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928 (2014); Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and
the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1369-78 (2009)
[hereinafter Nagy, Principles]; see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty
Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
881 (2010) (identifying the inconsistent ways in which insider trading law is applied).
30 This article operates under the premise that, as I have argued elsewhere, it
is the harm from criminal activity that is the guiding principle for establishing the scope
of criminal liability. See J. Kelly Strader, Lawrence’s Criminal Law, 16 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 41, 47 (2011); J. Kelly Strader, The Judicial Politics of White Collar Crime, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1270 (1999); Strader, White Collar Crime, supra note 23, at 55.
Others have focused on the moral wrongfulness of insider trading rather than upon the
harm that it causes. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Cheating, 23 LAW & PHIL. 137, 177-78
(2004); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78
TEX. L. REV. 375, 382 (1999). Whether viewed as harmful, immoral, or both, it is the
breach of duty that lies at the core of insider trading liability. See infra Part I.A.
31 This point, in fact, underlies the Chiarella opinion, which held that
common law fraud principles inform federal securities fraud. Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980).
32 See Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1985
(2006) [hereinafter Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud] (citing United States v. Harm, 442
F.3d 367, 372 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he mens rea for fraud is ‘specific intent to defraud.’”).
As discussed infra Part II.A, “specific intent” is not easily defined. As Prof. Buell points
out, intent to deceive or mislead alone cannot be sufficient, for such a definition does
not clearly separate out merely aggressive business activities from fraudulent ones.
Buell, Securities Fraud, supra note 23, at 539. For analogous reasoning in the mail
fraud context, see United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1180 (2d
Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court addressed the intent component of insider trading in
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653-54 (1997) discussed infra Part II.C.
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intentionally with respect to the breach of duty. This applies to
principals as well as to tippers and tippees. Criminal law exists
to punish the culpable, and culpability is tied to the defendant’s
mens rea; a defendant who did not act culpably should not be
criminally sanctioned.33
Sending someone to jail for up to 20 years for non-
intentionally using inside information runs counter to basic fraud
principles, which require that the defendant intentionally set out
with a plan to harm the victim of the fraud. The Supreme Court
has made the distinction between intentional and non-intentional
offenses in a number of significant cases, from a high profile
criminal antitrust case34 to a recent case assessing the concept of
“willful blindness.” The latter case, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc.
v. SEB S.A.,35 is particularly significant, for it distinguishes
willful blindness from the concept of “recklessness,” a mens rea
denoting accidental conduct that courts sometimes incorrectly
apply to insider trading law. In Global-Tech, the Court adopted
a rigorous test for willful blindness, a form of criminal “intent”
that is particularly apt for certain elements of insider trading.36
Building on both Newman and Global-Tech, this article
proposes that courts adopt jury instructions that more accurately
reflect culpability principles than the instructions that federal
courts currently employ in insider trading cases—such as the
flawed jury instructions in Newman. Absent a statutory definition
of insider trading, fuller and more accurate jury instructions are
central to rationalizing insider trading law.37
Using Newman and other recent Second Circuit insider
trading cases as focal points,38 this article examines the errors
that courts typically make when articulating the mens rea of
insider trading in general and tipper/tippee liability in particular.
The article then proposes that courts carefully delineate insider
trading elements and attach appropriate mens rea levels to
each element.
33 Cf. Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits of
Culpability’s Relevance, 75 L. & CONT. PROB. 109, 116 (2012) (“Instrumental goals of
maximizing harm prevention by more easily imposing punishment simply reject the
value of culpability.”).
34 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978).
35 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011).
Although a civil case, the decision has broad applicability to criminal cases as well.
36 See infra Part II.A.
37 See Goodman, supra note 17.
38 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. Goffer,
721 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2013); SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v.
Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555 F. App’x. 98 (2d Cir. 2014)
(Summary Order) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 352 (Nov. 10, 2014).
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Part I of this article provides an overview of insider
trading doctrine, including the traditional and misappropriation
theories and tipper/tippee liability, with a focus on the Newman
decision. This Part sets the context, based upon decades of
precedent, of insider trading as a form of the common law crime of
fraud. Part II then re-conceptualizes this law by carefully
employing common law fraud as the foundational doctrinal
principle and by tailoring the crime’s elements to the core
harms attendant to the fraudulent theft of property. This
article posits that, under the law of fraud, the core wrong of
insider trading is the theft of the intangible property interests
that are embodied in material nonpublic information.39 Each of
the insider trading elements, with respect to the attendant
mens rea required, should reflect this doctrinal grounding. Part
III then provides the framework for a systematic restatement
of the mens rea elements of insider trading in a set of proposed
jury instructions that matches culpability principles with each
of the actus reus elements. These instructions take the
Newman case as their starting point, but expand upon that
holding to make the jury instructions more systematic and
coherent. In this way, the article seeks to provide much-needed
consistency and clarity to insider trading law.
I. INSIDERTRADINGDOCTRINE AND THENEWMANDECISION40
Insider trading is a subspecies of securities fraud.41 This
section traces the development of the principal insider trading
theories—the traditional and misappropriation theories—as
39 See Richard W. Painter et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After
United States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 158 (1998) (noting that “the courts are
implicitly . . . creat[ing] a federal property right in information for certain persons”
when applying the misappropriation theory of insider trading).
40 “Insider trading” is a misnomer; one can be liable for trading on material
nonpublic information even if one is an “outsider”—that is, even when one has no
relationship with the issuer of the securities. See infra Part I.A. But the term “insider
trading” is ubiquitous in our culture and in the law, and so I use it here.
41 For present purposes I accept the proposition that insider trading should
be regulated and criminalized. This proposition has been subject to substantial debate,
with many arguing that the harm from insider trading is hard to prove and/or that
insider trading actually promotes market efficiency. See Kim, supra note 29, at 945-47;
Strader, White Collar Crime, supra note 23, at 68. For a discussion of the normative
underpinnings of insider trading prohibitions, see Stuart P. Green & Matthew B.
Kugler, When is it Wrong to Trade Stocks on the Basis of Non-Public Information?
Public Views of the Morality of Insider Trading, 39 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 445, 450-52
(2011). While I share others’ skepticism over the criminalization of insider trading, I
assume for purposes of this article that such criminalization is justified. For an earlier
analysis of this issue, see Strader, White Collar Crime, supra note 23, at 49.
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forms of securities fraud.42 The section also evaluates the theory
used in the recent high profile insider trading prosecutions—
tipper/tippee liability. The principal focus is on criminal insider
trading liability, though much of the analysis will also be
applicable to civil insider trading liability.43 Throughout this
analysis, the goal is to make sense of current insider trading
doctrine, with a focus on the Newman decision.44 In this way, we
can lay the groundwork for providing a systematic restatement of
the mens rea elements of insider trading.
A. The Traditional and Misappropriation Theories
Because no statute explicitly defines “insider trading,”
the law has generally developed through SEC and judicial
decisions reaching back more than 50 years.45 In broad terms,
the securities laws forbid buying or selling securities based upon
42 The many forms of civil and criminal securities fraud arise under a myriad
of statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions. See WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS
AND REGULATORYOFFENSES §§ 12.01-03 (Otto G. Obermaier et al., eds., 2014).
43 Courts, including the Supreme Court, consistently cite and rely upon civil
and criminal cases fairly indiscriminately. In fact, it is difficult to discern a clear
distinction between the standards for civil and criminal cases. This article focuses on the
mental element necessary for criminal insider trading liability. Some overlap between
civil and criminal liability is unavoidable, however. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Essay,
What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar Criminal Law, 43 HOUS. L.
REV. 591, 601 (2006) [hereinafter Moohr, Stewart] (“The merger of civil and criminal
standards means that the only distinction between civil and criminal liability is the
standard of proof in a criminal case, beyond a reasonable doubt.”). In insider trading
cases brought under Section 10b, the only statutory distinction is the requirement that
the government prove that a defendant in a criminal case acted “willfully.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ff(a) (2012). See Brian J. Carr, Culpable Intent Required for All Criminal Insider
Trading Convictions after United States v. O’Hagan, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1188 (1999).
As discussed more fully below, infra Part II.A, the statutes do not define this term, and
courts struggle with what this requirement actually adds to the government’s burden.
44 I accept the United States Supreme Court’s definition of insider trading as a
form of the common law theft crime of fraud; as a form of theft, this crime deprives its
victims of their property interest in confidential information. In this sense, I do not
undertake a reformulation of insider trading theory. For examples of such reformulations,
see Kim, supra note 29; Nagy, Principles, supra note 29. Instead, my goal is to flesh out the
underlying fraud theory upon which insider trading law is already grounded.
45 The most important early decisions are In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907 (1961), and SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1969).
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material,46 nonpublic47 information obtained in breach of a duty
owed to the source of the information.48
Insider trading cases initially were brought under the
“traditional,” also termed the “classical,” theory.49 Under the
traditional theory, a corporate insider breaches a duty to the
corporation’s shareholders if the insider trades on material,
nonpublic information without first disclosing the information to
the shareholders. Those cases also asserted that it was unfair for
a person to trade on information that was not generally available
to the investing public.50 The latter rationale is sometimes termed
the “parity of information” approach.51
The United States Supreme Court rejected the parity of
information rationale in its 1980 decision in Chiarella v. United
States,52 the foundational case for modern insider trading law.
Chiarella worked for a printing company that represented
corporate clients seeking to acquire target companies.53 The
defendant was able to profit because he bought the target
companies’ stock before the offers were made public and sold at a
significant profit after the information went public. The
government charged Chiarella with securities fraud based upon
46 Materiality is an element of the offense. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976). According to the Supreme Court, information is material if there
is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information made available.”
47 The nonpublic nature of the information is also an element of the offense.
See SEC v. Svoboda, 409 F. Supp. 2d 331, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
48 The SEC can bring an administrative action or a civil insider trading case
seeking disgorgement, injunctive relief, and other remedies. Private parties may also
bring civil cases in certain instances. In addition or instead, the Department of Justice
can bring a criminal case. Many forms of securities fraud may also give rise to private
civil lawsuits. This article does not focus on the scienter required for such suits. For an
overview of criminal and civil enforcement paths, see Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Balance
Among Corporate Criminal Liability, Private Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1459 (2009).
49 See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
50 See, e.g., Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848 (“[T]he Rule is based in policy
on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on
impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information.”).
51 As Prof. Coffee has noted, “most securities law scholars and practitioners have
resisted a parity-of-information approach to defining the scope of the insider trading
prohibition because it would dull market efficiency by chilling the incentive to search for
new information.” John C. Coffee, Jr., Introduction: Mapping the Future of Insider Trading
Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps, and Strategies, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281, 312-13 (2013).
52 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
53 A tender offer is an announcement by an offering company that it intends to
acquire the stock of another (the “target”) company at a specified price above the then-
prevailing market price for the stock. After the tender offer is made public, the price of the
target company’s stock generally rises. See J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE
COLLARCRIME 106-07 & n.62 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter STRADER, UNDERSTANDING].
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the theory that he defrauded the target companies’ shareholders
from whom he purchased his stock.
The Court reversed Chiarella’s conviction, essentially
holding that securities fraud is just that—a form of fraud. The
Court noted that Chiarella was not charged based upon any
affirmative misrepresentation to the targets’ shareholders.
Instead, the theory was that he committed fraud based upon an
omission, that is, that he failed to disclose the confidential
information—the pending acquisitions—that he possessed but
that the sellers of the target companies’ stock did not.54
On these facts, the Court held that the nondisclosure theory
was fatally flawed. As the Court explained, “[a]t common law,
misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance upon
the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to disclose
material information prior to the consummation of a transaction
commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so.”55 Because
Chiarella owed no duty to the alleged victims (the persons with
whom he traded), he could not be liable based upon omissions.
The Court expressly rejected an alternate theory—a
“duty to the market” theory—that both the lower courts and
the government had relied upon.56 Under this theory, anyone
who possesses material nonpublic information is a “market
insider” and must disclose the information “to the investing
public” or refrain from trading.57 The Court held that there is
no duty to the market as a whole; rather, duties derive from
common law principles of fraud.58
The Court also declined to consider the validity of a third
theory—the “misappropriation theory”—because it had not been
raised at trial.59 In the years following Chiarella, most federal
54 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226 (“[T]his case concerns the legal effect of the
petitioner’s silence.”).
55 See id. at 227-28.
56 The Second Circuit had held that “[a]nyone—corporate insider or not—who
regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to
trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.” United States v.
Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir.1978), rev’d, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
57 Id. at 1364 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc)). In rejecting the duty to the market theory, the Supreme Court in Chiarella
did not explicitly state to whom the disclosure must be made, but at minimum disclosure is
required to the person(s) with whom the insider is trading. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227
(“‘[I]nsiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position
but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect
their investment judgment.’”) (quoting Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961)
(emphasis added)).
58 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 (“[N]ot every instance of financial unfairness
constitutes fraudulent activity under Section 10(b).”).
59 Under this theory, Chiarella breached a duty to his employer, the printing
company, and perhaps also a duty owed to his employer’s clients, see Dirks v. SEC, 463
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circuit courts approved the misappropriation theory.60 Courts
applied the theory in a wide array of contexts.
One of the most notable cases was Carpenter v. United
States,61 in which the defendants were charged with insider
trading and with mail fraud based upon that trading. The case
hinged on the activities of a Wall Street Journal reporter who
wrote a widely read financial column that had the capacity to
affect stock prices. The reporter and his tippees traded the stock
of companies discussed in the column, netting substantial profits.
Because none of the defendants were insiders of the companies at
issue, they could not be charged under the traditional theory.
Instead, the government alleged that the reporter had breached
his duty of confidentiality to the Journal by using its secret
information to his advantage.
The defendants were convicted of securities fraud and
mail fraud, and appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court
affirmed the mail fraud convictions, but split four-to-four on
whether the misappropriation theory is a valid basis for insider
trading liability.62 As the Court noted, however, “[i]t was this
appropriation of confidential information that underlay both the
securities laws and mail and wire fraud counts.”63 As will be seen
below,64 the decision’s doctrinal underpinning in the mail fraud
context applies to the Court’s insider trading jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court finally approved the misappropriation
theory in United States v. O’Hagan.65 O’Hagan was an attorney
whose law firm represented a potential bidder for a target
company. As in Chiarella, O’Hagan used that information to
U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983), to whom he owed a common law fiduciary duty, by using
confidential business information belonging to the employer—in effect, by stealing or
“misappropriating” this information. By not disclosing that use, the theory goes, Chiarella
defrauded the printing company. The Court did not address this argument because the
government had not charged or tried Chiarella based on that theory. Chiarella, 445 U.S.
at 236. The Court later accepted this theory in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,
650 (1997), discussed below.
60 See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991); SEC v.
Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453 (9th Cir. 1990).
61 484 U.S. 19, 19 (1987).
62 In an important holding for our purposes, the Court did affirm the
defendants’ mail fraud convictions. The Court held that the government had proven that
the defendants had used the mails to deprive the Journal of its property interest in its
confidential business information, that is, in the contents of the reporter’s column. See
infra Part II.C. This holding was not without controversy. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Hush!:
The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter and The
Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 121 (1988-1989)
[hereinafter Coffee,Hush].
63 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24.
64 See infra Part I.B.2.
65 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997).
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profit from trading in the target’s stock. This time, however, the
government alleged that the victims of the fraud were the law
firm and its client, rather than the persons with whom the
defendant traded.66
The Court affirmed O’Hagan’s conviction on the theory
that he misappropriated confidential information from the law
firm and its client without disclosing that theft.67 Relying heavily
on Carpenter, the Court focused on the defendant’s breach of
duty to the law firm and its client.68 Consistent with its
Chiarella holding, the Court stated that “[d]eception through
nondisclosure is central to the theory of liability for which the
government seeks recognition.”69 Thus, if the alleged thief
discloses the possession and use of the information to its source,
then there is no breach of duty and no liability.70
The Court provided a core policy rationale for extending
insider trading liability to misappropriators. The misappropriation
theory, according to the Court, is “well tuned to an animating
purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets
and thereby promote investor confidence.”71
It is worth emphasizing that the market integrity rationale
in O’Hagan has its distinct limits. As the Court explained, if an
employee sought and gained permission to use the confidential
information, then there would be no breach of duty and no
liability under Section 10b.72 This is true even though the threat
66 Id. at 648.
67 Id. at 665-66.
68 See infra Part I.B.2.
69 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654. See David T. Cohen, Old Rule, New Theory:
Revising the Personal Benefit Requirement for Tipper/Tippee Liability Under the
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading, 47 B.C. L. REV. 547, 557 (2006) (concluding
that the Court adopted common law agency principles in “deriving the scope of the
misappropriation theory”); see Kim, supra note 29, at 943-45 (same). As discussed in
detail below, the Court set forth this doctrinal underpinning in Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987), which affirmed an insider trading conviction under the
mail fraud statute. See infra Part II.B.2.
70 “[F]ull disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation theory:
Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning
fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he
plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no
Section 10(b) violation . . . . ” O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655. For a discussion of the sort of
disclosure required under the traditional theory, see Kim, supra note 29, at 978.
71 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658 (“Although informational disparity is inevitable in
the securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market
where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law.”).
72 Although O’Hagan implied that disclosure alone could be sufficient, this
seems implausible; otherwise, the thief could simply say, “look, I’m stealing from you,”
and thus avoid responsibility. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 29, at 944 (discussing SEC v.
Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006)). In addition to the disclosure, permission to use
the information should also be required. As the Court noted in Carpenter, the theft of
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to market integrity is the same as if the employee had been acting
without permission.73
The Court in O’Hagan thus affirmed Chiarella’s essential
holding: insider trading liability is rooted in common law fraud.74
Fraud requires a breach of duty, and it is the harm to the
information’s owner that is the core wrong.75 Although the
Court emphasized risks to “market integrity,” it did not call
into question Chiarella’s holding that a market participant
does not owe a duty to the market in general, or to market
participants in particular.76
In sum, in any insider trading case under Section 10b and
Rule 10b-5, liability rests upon theft of material nonpublic
information in breach of a duty. The person can be a corporate
insider who buys or sells corporate securities, or can be a
corporate outsider who has misappropriated the information. (In
this sense, the term “insider trading” is too narrow; a person can
be liable without being an insider.) When that insider or
confidential information is akin to the crime of embezzlement. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19,
27 (1987). Embezzlement requires proof that one entrusted with property converted the
property to that person’s own use, accompanied by a specific intent to defraud the
owner of the property. SeeWAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 19.6(f) (5th ed. 2009).
73 Critics have noted that the boundaries of fiduciary duties or their
“equivalent” are imprecise and subject to a void-for-vagueness challenge. See Painter et
al., supra note 39, at 177. The SEC has attempted to clarify the scope of the applicable
duties in Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1). Whether that attempt has been
successful is the subject of substantial debate. See, e.g., Ryan M. Davis, Trimming the
“Judicial Oak:” Rule 10b5-2(B)(1), Confidentiality Agreements, and the Proper Scope of
Insider Trading Liability, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1469 (2010); Hazen, supra note 29, at 896.
One principal source of confusion is whether state law, federal common law, or some
other source defines the duties. See, e.g., United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363,
370 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555 F. App’x. 98 (2d Cir. 2014) (Summary Order) (unpublished
opinion), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 352 (Nov. 10, 2014) (holding that Rule 10b-5 is based on
federal common law rather than on state law conceptions of fiduciary duties). In SEC v.
Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010), the Fifth Circuit seemed to assume that § 10b5-2
expands the notion of common law duties. For an analysis of this aspect of the Cuban
decision, see Kim, supra note 29, at 1000-03. This article does not undertake a detailed
analysis of the types of duties that trigger securities fraud liability, nor does it undertake
an analysis of the validity of § 10b5-2.
74 See Allison M. Vissichelli, Intent to Reconcile: SEC v. Obus, the Second
Circuit’s Edification of the Tippee Scienter Standard, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 776 (2013)
(noting “insider trading regulation’s foundation in common law fraud”).
75 See Painter et al., supra note 39, at 226 (“‘[T]he only conceivable justification
for banning insider trading is that such trading involves the theft of valuable corporate
property from its rightful owner.’”) (quoting JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING:
ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 67 (1991)).
76 Insider trading can be prosecuted under laws other than Section 10b and
Rule 10b-5. Section 14 of the Exchange Act and Rule 14e-3(a) thereunder, for example,
forbid trading while in possession of material nonpublic information relating to a
tender offer. Rule 14e-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a). Rule 14e-3 provides that trading
on such information violates the rule irrespective of whether the information was
obtained in breach of a duty. Id. In O’Hagan, the Court upheld the regulation as
applied to the facts of the case. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 689-90.
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misappropriator, or another person (a “tippee”), buys or sells
securities armed with the material, nonpublic information, then
insider trading has potentially occurred.
Finally, it is important to note that all insiders who trade
on material nonpublic information are also misappropriators;
they have taken—misappropriated—confidential information and
used it without disclosing that use to the shareholders. The
reverse is not true, however; some misappropriators—such as the
reporter in Carpenter and the attorney in O’Hagan—are not liable
as insiders, but only as misappropriators.
B. Tipper/Tippee Liability
In a straightforward case, when an insider has traded
on confidential information, or when a misappropriator has
stolen information from an employer, the breach of duty is
usually easy to identify and the assessment of the alleged
wrongdoer’s culpability is relatively straightforward. In either
case, there has been a direct breach of trust by the insider or
misappropriator. When tippers and tippees are involved,
however, assessing liability becomes much more complex. This
is particularly true in cases involving multiple tippers and
tippees. At each step in the chain, the elements of insider
trading liability apply.
1. The Dirks Decision
The Supreme Court established the outline for tipper/tippee
liability in Dirks v. SEC.77 In that case, insiders of Equity Funding
Inc. were concerned about ongoing fraud at the company. They
revealed the fraud to Dirks, an investment advisor, with the intent
that Dirks investigate and expose the fraud. Dirks passed the
information to his clients, who sold Equity Funding stock and
avoided the losses that they would have incurred had they held
the stock until the fraud was made public. The SEC imposed
sanctions on Dirks based upon the theory that he aided and
abetted his clients’ “inside” trading.78
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Dirks was
not liable. In the key part of the opinion, the Court reaffirmed
Chiarella’s fundamental holding that securities fraud based
upon non-disclosure must be based upon a breach of duty.79
77 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662-65 (1983).
78 Id. at 646.
79 Id. at 664.
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Dirks himself did not have a duty to Equity Funding.80 He
could, however, be liable as a tippee based upon a “derivative
breach” of duty flowing from an original breach by the inside
tippers.81 As the Court stated,
a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only
when (1) the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and (2) the
tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.82
Leaving the second part of the rule aside for now,83 the
critical holding is the definition of the breach of duty. An
insider’s simple disclosure of material nonpublic information
does not, standing alone, constitute a breach. Rather, the
disclosure constitutes a breach only when the tipper passes the
information to a tippee for the tipper’s personal gain. The
Court defined personal gain as a monetary or career benefit to
the tipper, or the tipper’s gift of valuable information to the
tippee.84 Because, as the SEC did not dispute, the insider
tippers acted solely to expose the fraud, they did not act for
personal gain. Because the tippers did not act for personal
gain, they did not breach their duty to Equity Funding by
tipping Dirks. And because the tippers did not breach a duty,
Dirks did not engage in a derivative breach of duty; there was
no initial breach from which his breach could derive. Again, the
Court articulated the core insider trading harm as the breach
of duty owed to the source of the information.85
Finally, it is important to note that, in 2000, the SEC
adopted Regulation FD.86 This rule forbids issuers from selectively
disclosing material nonpublic information to market professionals,
but instead requires disclosure to the public at large. This rule,
however, does not supplant preexisting laws and regulations
80 Id. at 665.
81 Id. at 662.
82 Id. at 660 (internal numbering added).
83 The requirement that the tippee “knows or should know that there has
been a breach,” id. at 660, is discussed infra Part III.A.3
84 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667. Prof. Kim argues that Dirks conflated “the insider’s
duty of disclosure owed to the shareholders” with the “duty of loyalty and confidentiality,
which is owed to the corporation.” Kim, supra note 29, at 941. In either event, it is the
breach of duty that underlies the tipper’s liability and the tippee’s derivative liability.
Further, after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,
650 (1997), all insiders who steal information are liable under both the traditional theory
(which formed the basis of the Dirks decision) and under O’Hagan’s misappropriation
theory. See supra Part I.A.
85 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
86 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a).
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concerning insider trading, including the Dirks test for
tipper/tippee liability.87 Indeed, in its brief in the Newman appeal,
the government appeared to concede this point.88
2. Applying Dirks to Misappropriation Cases
Although the case law now sets the parameters of insider
trading law in general terms, there is one substantial open
question that the United States Supreme Court has not
resolved. Dirks arose under the traditional theory; the tippers
were insiders of Equity Funding. Lower courts have struggled to
ascertain (1) whether Dirks tippee liability applies where the
tipper is a misappropriator, rather than an insider, and, (2) if so,
whether each element of the Dirks rule applies under the
misappropriation theory.89 For present purposes, let us again
focus on the harm from insider trading: to the corporation and its
shareholders under the traditional theory, and to the source of the
information under the misappropriation theory. It is the breach of
trust, under the traditional and misappropriation theories, that
gives rise to liability. It makes no sense, in this light, to limit the
Dirks rule and each of its elements to the traditional theory; the
harm that flows from tippee trading occurs whether the tipper
was an insider or misappropriator. As the Second Circuit noted in
SEC v. Obus, although Dirks was decided in a traditional insider
trading case, “the same analysis governs in a misappropriation
case.”90 The Second Circuit explained that the misappropriator
engages in deception “by pretending ‘loyalty to the principal while
secretly converting the principal’s information for personal gain.’”91
87 See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Willful Blindness, Plausible Deniability and
Tippee Liability: SAC, Steven Cohen, and the Court’s Opinion in Dirks, 15
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 47, 59 (2013) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2013)).
88 See Anello & Albert, Resolve, supra note 5.
89 Two of the cases upon which this article focuses appear to disagree on this
vital issue. The district court in United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 363, 371
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555 F. App’x. 98 (2d Cir. 2014) (Summary Order) (unpublished
opinion), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 352 (Nov. 10, 2014) stated that the intent to benefit
element does not apply to misappropriation cases, and dismissed the Second Circuit’s
contrary view in SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 289 (2d Cir. 2012). In a footnote, the court in
Whitman acknowledged that other courts have either directly held or have implied that
an intent to benefit is a required element in a tipper/tippee case brought under the
misappropriation theory. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. at 371 n.6 (citing SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d
1263, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003)); see also SEC. v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000). For
a list of cases applying both approaches see Nelson S. Ebaugh, Insider Trading Liability
for Tippers and Tippees: A Call for the Consistent Application of the Personal Benefit Test,
39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 265, 281 (2003).
90 Obus, 693 F.3d at 285-86 (citing United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226,
233 (2d Cir. 2001)).
91 Id. at 284-85 (internal citations omitted) (quotingO’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653).
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The court further noted that, if the alleged misappropriator
discloses the information to its source, then there is no breach of
duty and no insider trading liability.92
A number of cases have affirmed tippee liability where the
tipper is a misappropriator, applying each of the Dirks elements.93
The SEC famously charged Martha Stewart under precisely this
theory, and a number of high profile criminal cases have also been
brought under this theory.94 Importantly, all culpable inside
tippers are also misappropriators—they have breached a duty of
confidentiality to the corporation and its shareholders. Because
both theories apply to insiders, requiring different elements for
the two theories is doctrinally inconsistent.95
Assuming that Dirks applies where the tipper is a
misappropriator, courts have further struggled as to whether the
“intent to benefit” element—which requires that the tipper
provide the tip to the tippee for personal benefit—must be proven
in a misappropriation case or is only necessary in a traditional
theory case.96 Given the animating purpose of tipper/tippee
liability, the element must apply under both theories.
Where the tipper does not breach a duty to the source
of the information, there is no culpability under the
Chiarella/Dirks/O’Hagan line of cases; Dirks says that absent
an intent to benefit, the tipper does not breach a duty.
Some have argued that courts are moving away from
fiduciary duties as insider trading’s animating principle, citing as
an example a “hacking and trading” case, SEC v. Dorozhko.97 The
92 Id. at 285.
93 See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993); SEC v.
Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d 367, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Falcone, 257 F.3d at 227
(upholding tippee liability under the misappropriation theory where the tipper owed a
duty to the owner of the misappropriated information and the tippee knew that the
tipper breached that duty).
94 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987); Falcone, 257
F.3d at 227. For an analysis of the Stewart case, see Moohr, Stewart, supra note 43, at
619; Strader, White Collar Crime, supra note 23, at 70-80.
95 Obus, 693 F.3d at 285-86 (“The Supreme Court’s tipping liability doctrine was
developed in a classical case, Dirks, but the same analysis governs in a misappropriation
case.”); SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he need for an identical
approach to determining tipper and tippee liability under the two theories becomes evident
when one realizes that nearly all violations under the classical theory of insider trading can
be alternatively characterized as misappropriations.”).
96 Compare Yun, 327 F.3d at 1282 (holding that the intent to benefit test
under Dirks requires more than proof that the tippee was “severely reckless”), with
Libera, 989 F.2d at 600 (rejecting intent to benefit test and holding that tipper’s
knowledge of breach suffices under a tippee misappropriation theory).
97 SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009). See, e.g., Kim, supra note 29,
at 998-1000; Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of
Entrustment, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1113 n.40 (2011). Prof. Kim notes that “a majority
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defendant in that case hacked into the computer of a company,
stole information, and traded on it. The district court dismissed
the case, but the Second Circuit reversed and remanded.98
The Second Circuit’s opinion does not, however, support
the proposition that courts are retreating from the fiduciary duty
requirement. A fiduciary duty or its equivalent is required in all
omissions cases, in accordance with common law fraud principles,
per Chiarella. The Second Circuit in Dorozhko did not hold that
the hacker could be liable based on an omission.99 Instead, the
court held that an affirmative act of deception was required
because the hacker owed no duty to the source of the information;
the court remanded for a determination of whether the hacking
entailed an affirmative misrepresentation.100 The Supreme Court
has never retreated from its requirement that a breach of duty is
required in all omissions cases.101
3. The Newman Decision
In Newman,102 the Second Circuit issued one of the most
highly anticipated insider trading decisions in years,103 and in
the process, reaffirmed the core Dirks doctrine outlined above.
As discussed more fully in the sections below, Newman
of commentators believe that current insider trading law does not cover hacker trader
cases, but that most believe that it should be.” Kim, supra note 29, at 998.
98 Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 43.
99 The more complex issue may be whether the fraud—the hacking—was
“in connection with” the trading. See Stephen Bainbridge, The Second Circuit’s
Egregious Decision in SEC v. Dorozhko, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 29, 2009),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/07/the-second-circuits-
recent-decision-in-sec-v-dorozhko-available-here-dealt-with-one-of-the-questions-left-open-
by-the.html. It seems likely that O’Hagan’s broad reading of the “in connection with”
requirement would bring “hacking and trading” within the ambit of Section 10b. See United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 667 (1997).
100 Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 49-51. It is unclear why the government insisted on
bringing an insider trading allegation in this case, when the action seemed to clearly
violate the computer fraud statute and probably the wire fraud statute, as the district
judge noted in the case. Id. at 45. In any event, a hacker may engage in an affirmative
misrepresentation, as the Second Circuit noted. Id. at 51. This is what distinguishes a
hacker from, say, a person who finds a prospectus that has fallen off of a truck and
trades on the material nonpublic information contained in that prospectus.
101 Dorozhko did not oppose the SEC’s motion for summary judgment on
remand. See SEC Litigation Release No. 21465 (Mar. 29, 2010),http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21465.htm. The substantive issue in the case—whether the
hacking involved an affirmative misrepresentation—was thus never litigated. Despite
all the commentary that it generated, Dorozhko has had minimal impact as precedent;
I located no insider trading case that has cited Dorozhko for the proposition that a
breach of duty is no longer required in omission cases.
102 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
103 See generally Anello & Albert, supra note 5.
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attempted to resolve conflicting standards that the Second
Circuit had applied to tippee liability over the years.
To recap the facts outlined above, Newman involved a
complex, multi-level alleged insider trading scheme. The
government charged that a group of hedge fund and investment
firm analysts received tips from insiders of technology companies,
shared the information concerning the companies’ financial
projections, and later passed the tips to the portfolio managers—
including defendants Newman and Chiasson—at the analysts’
firms.104 Both defendants were convicted as tippees.
The Second Circuit’s decision reversing the convictions
contains four major holdings. In its opinion, the court (1)
clarified the nature of a tipper’s breach of duty, (2) defined the
level of proof required for the tipper’s breach of duty, (3)
clarified the standard for the tippee’s mens rea as to the
tipper’s breach, and (4) defined the level of proof required for
the tippee’s mens rea as to the tipper’s breach. Each of these
holdings merits close attention.
On the first issue, the court affirmedDirks’ basic holding:
Dirks counsels us that the exchange of confidential information for
personal benefit is not separate from an insider’s fiduciary breach; it
is the fiduciary breach that triggers liability for securities fraud
under Rule 10b–5. For purposes of insider trading liability, the
insider’s disclosure of confidential information, standing alone, is not
a breach.105
Thus, for there to be a breach by the tipper, the tipper must be
acting for personal benefit; without the intent to obtain a personal
benefit from the tip, there is no breach by the tipper, and neither
the tipper nor the tippee can be liable. Significantly, the court also
acknowledged the Supreme Court’s previous rejection of a parity-
of-information rule: “Although the government might like the law
to be different, nothing in the law requires a symmetry of
information in the nation’s securities markets.”106
Second, the court defined the type and degree of benefit
that the tipper must anticipate for the disclosure of the
information to amount to a breach under Dirks. Initially, the
court stated that “personal benefit” includes not only direct
financial benefits but also any “‘reputational benefit that will
translate into future earnings and the benefit one would obtain
from simply making a gift of confidential information to a trading
104 Newman, 773 F.3d at 443-44.
105 Id. at 447-48 (second emphasis added).
106 Id. at 448-49.
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relative or friend.’”107 The court explained that this element
requires “proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and
represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly
valuable nature.”108 A mere casual friendship or acquaintance will
not suffice in the absence of this additional level of proof.109
Third, in addition to defining the meaning of “breach”
under Dirks, the court explained the corresponding proof of
mens rea that the government must prove as to tippees. If a
tippee believes that the tip was legal—that the information
was not passed in breach of a duty, defined as the personal
benefit to the tipper—then the tippee is not liable. “[W]ithout
establishing that the tippee knows of the personal benefit
received by the insider in exchange for the disclosure, the
Government cannot meet its burden of showing that the tippee
knew of a breach.”110
Finally, the court expounded upon the level of proof
required on the element of the tippee’s knowledge of the tipper’s
breach. In a surprising and non-appealable holding, the court
held that the government had adduced insufficient evidence on
this element as a matter of law.111 The court stated,
no reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
[the defendant-tippees] knew, or deliberately avoided knowing, that
the information originated with corporate insiders. In general,
information about a firm’s finances could certainly be sufficiently
detailed and proprietary to permit the inference that the tippee knew
that the information came from an inside source. But in this case,
where the financial information is of a nature regularly and accurately
predicted by analyst modeling, and the tippees are several levels
removed from the source, the inference that defendants knew, or
should have known, that the information originated with a corporate
insider is unwarranted.112
This is perhaps Newman’s core holding and one that
should not be surprising to anyone. The Supreme Court in
107 Id. at 452 (quoting United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013)).
108 Id. (“[T]his requires evidence of ‘a relationship between the insider and the
recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the
[latter].’”) (quoting Jiau, 734 F.3d at 153) (alteration in original).
109 Id. (otherwise the government could “meet its burden by proving that two
individuals were alumni of the same school or attended the same church, the personal benefit
requirement would be a nullity.”) In its motion for rehearing, the government focused solely on
this aspect of theNewman decision. SeeDiamond, Personal Benefit, supra note 4.
110 Id. at 448. Significantly, in its motion for rehearing, the government did not
contest this portion of theNewman holding. SeeDiamond, Personal Benefit, supra note 4.
111 Id. at 454-55.
112 Id. at 455.
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Dirks held that the tippee must have some awareness of the
tipper’s breach, and defined the tipper’s breach as acting for
personal gain. If the tippee was not aware that the tipper was
acting for personal gain, then as a matter of simple logic this
element of tippee liability is not met.
Significantly, however, and as discussed in more detail
below, the court in Newman failed to clarify the meaning of the
Dirks’ “should have known” language. Initially, in the language
quoted above, the court in Newman required proof that the tippee
had actual or constructive knowledge of the tipper’s breach of
duty. Two sentences later, however, the opinion references Dirks’
“should have known” standard, thus conflating the subjective
mens rea standard of knowledge and the objective mens rea
standard of simple negligence.113
The Newman decision goes a long way towards clarifying
the mens rea of insider trading with respect to tippers and
tippees. Nonetheless, the court left some gaps as to the precise
levels of mens rea that must be proven. The next section explores
the appropriate levels of mens rea that attach to insider trading
as a form of fraud.
II. CONCEPTUALIZING INSIDER TRADING AS FRAUD
This article places insider trading, as defined in the
preceding section, in the context of criminal law offenses in
general and securities fraud in particular. And as the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held, securities fraud is itself grounded in
the common law of fraud. That lower courts have misinterpreted
and misapplied the law of fraud does not mean that fraud is an
unworkable basis for insider trading law. One of the principal
contributions of the Newman decision is to clarify (with some
gaps) how the intentionality of common law fraud applies to
tippers and tippees.
In (re)conceptualizing insider trading as a form of the
crime of fraud, I do not attempt to construct a new insider trading
model.114 It is highly unlikely, in my view, that courts will adopt a
comprehensive reworking of insider trading law, and it is unclear
whether Congress is willing or able to take that step.115 Instead,
113 See id.
114 See Kim, supra note 29, at 932; Nagy, Principles, supra note 29, at 1369.
115 Insider trading is just one of the many areas in which Congress has failed
to carefully delineate and define the mens rea elements of crimes. See Moohr, Playing,
supra note 25, at 685 (“Congress can . . . be faulted for its focus on conduct and its lack
of attention to mens rea terms.”). In the wake of the Newman decision, bills have been
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courts should focus on insider trading as a subspecies of common
law fraud, and should define the elements of the offense
accordingly. Insider trading as a form of fraud is the most well-
articulated substantive policy framework that we now have for
cabining the scope of insider trading liability. It also has the
advantage of drawing upon the well-developed history and theory
of common law fraud. The more that insider trading law is
untethered from the law of fraud, the greater the risk that the
boundaries of insider trading law become indistinct.
With one exception, the actus reus elements of insider
trading are generally well-established.116 As Newman
demonstrates,117 however, courts are in disarray as to the mens
rea of insider trading. By assessing the appropriate mens rea
levels that should attach to the actus reus elements, we can
draw the line between conduct that warrants criminal
punishment and conduct that does not.
This Part first defines the basic mens rea concepts that
apply to fraud crimes. It then places insider trading within the
context of fraud in general and business and regulatory offenses
in particular. Finally, this section examines recent case law to
examine whether, and to what degree, courts have defined the
mens rea of insider trading in accordance with common law fraud.
A. Distinguishing Intentional from Non-Intentional Offenses
Before turning to the elements of insider trading, this
section provides a brief but essential overview of current mens
rea118 concepts and terminology applicable to insider trading.119
introduced to define insider trading. See Rob Tricchinelli, House Bill, the Third Since
Newman Case, Would Supersede Ruling on Tippee Liability, 10 White Collar Crime Rep.
(BNA) No. 7, at 257 (Mar. 26, 2015). These bills appear to apply a negligence standard.
See id. As argued throughout this article, negligence is an inappropriate mens rea
standard in the fraud context.
116 See infra note 261 for a discussion of the “possession” vs. “use” debate in
insider trading law.
117 See Anello & Albert, Resolve, supra note 5.
118 Courts sometimes use the term “scienter” as a synonym for criminal mens
rea. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994). To
further complicate matters, “scienter” is commonly used to describe the mental state
required in civil securities fraud cases. See Moohr, Stewart, supra note 43, at 601. To
avoid confusion, this article uses the term “mens rea” throughout.
119 A mens rea, or criminal mind, is a fundamental element in criminal law.
See, e.g., X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72; United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422, 446 (1978); Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1952). The Supreme
Court has approved of dispensing with the men rea requirement, that is, imposing
strict liability, only when (1) Congress clearly intended to impose strict liability and (2)
the crime is a “public welfare” offense that threatens substantial harm to the public.
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Proof of a culpable mental state is a requirement of both civil and
criminal insider trading liability. Courts (and legislatures) are
notoriously imprecise, however, when identifying and defining
mens rea levels.120 This is particularly apparent in securities
fraud cases in general and in insider trading cases in particular.
Given that insider trading is largely a court-created offense, the
current state of affairs is highly problematic.
In terms of defining and applying insider trading
elements, this article proposes that courts adopt Model Penal
Code (MPC) principles when interpreting insider trading law.
Adopted after decades of reform efforts undertaken by the
American Law Institute and others, the MPC attempted
nothing less than a comprehensive restructuring of the criminal
law.121 Some 34 states have revised their penal codes according
to MPC principles, to greater and lesser degrees.122 Even in
jurisdictions that have not adopted the MPC, most notably the
federal government and California,123 courts frequently cite the
MPC as persuasive authority.124
See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73 (1975). These circumstances do not
apply to securities fraud in general or to insider trading in particular.
120 For an overview, see Brown, supra note 33. Legislators compound the problem
by drafting imprecise criminal codes. The federal criminal code is perhaps the key offender.
See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1503, 1507 (2007) (“The federal criminal code is a bloated and disorganized hodgepodge.”);
Julie R O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case
Study, 96 J. CRIM. L.&CRIMINOLOGY 643, 643-64 (2006).
121 The precision and structure of the code distinguish it from the hodge-podge
of common law-based codes that existed before the MPC was promulgated and that still
exists in many jurisdictions including the federal system. See Seigel, supra note 23, at
1565 (describing the MPC’s birth as “a rare moment of collective genius”).
122 Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code:
A Brief Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 326 (2007); see generally MARKUS
DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE (2002) [hereinafter, DUBBER, MPC].
123 The federal criminal code does not provide consistent, clearly defined mens
rea elements, nor does it set forth general interpretive principles. See Moohr, Playing,
supra note 25, at 692. Largely for this reason, the United States Supreme Court has
relied heavily on the MPC when interpreting the mens rea elements of criminal
offenses. See Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 444 (“The . . . [MPC] is one source of guidance upon
which the Court has relied to illuminate questions [concerning required levels of mens
rea].”). Others have proposed importing MPC principles into securities fraud in
general, see Seigel, supra note 23, but those proposals do not delve into the particulars
of insider trading liability.
124 See Robinson & Dubber, supra note 122, at 327 (“Thousands of court
opinions have cited the Model Penal Code as persuasive authority for the
interpretation of an existing statute or in the exercise of a court’s occasional power to
formulate a criminal law doctrine.”). The United States Supreme Court has cited the
MPC well over 100 times. See DUBBER, MPC, supra note 122, at 7. Even when the
Court does not explicitly cite the MPC, it applies MPC-type analysis when interpreting
criminal statutes. See Leonid Traps, “Knowingly” Ignorant: Mens Rea Distribution in
Federal Criminal Law After Flores-Figueroa, Note, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 643 (2012)
(“The Court’s interpretive choice and rhetoric evoked the language and spirit of the
Model Penal Code’s approach.”).
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Among its most notable reforms, the MPC adopts a
precise structure for parsing and interpreting criminal
statutes.125 First, the MPC separates the actus reus from the
mens rea components. An actus reus element may take one of
three forms: conduct (for example, driving under the influence),
a result (for example, causing injury while driving under the
influence), or a circumstance (the driver actually being under
the influence).126 Although the distinctions among conduct,
result, and circumstance are often confusing in the abstract, the
distinctions generally are easy to apply to particular crimes.127
Second, the MPC identifies four possible levels of mens rea that
might apply to the actus reus element or elements. Third, the
MPC provides us with methods for ascertaining which level of
mens rea applies to each of the actus reus elements.128
By clarifying the imprecise, overlapping, and confusing
common law mens rea definitions, MPC section 2.02’s mens rea
definitions—purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence—
have been enormously influential.129 The MPC’s overriding
structural goal is to align culpability with punishment.130
Accordingly, the MPC’s ranking of mens rea levels reflects our
understanding of the relative culpability of offenders under basic
punishment principles.131 The higher the level of culpability—as
defined by the level of mens rea that the government has
125 Although precise and influential, the MPC has not eliminated all ambiguity
in defining and applying mens rea concepts. In both MPC and common law jurisdictions,
for example, the term “intent” is used in different ways in criminal cases. First, “intent” is
often employed as a synonym for mens rea in general: a court might, for example address
the type of “intent” required for a particular crime. Second, the term “intent” may be used
to signify a particular level of mens rea. See Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 435 (“[A] defendant’s
state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense.”). The common law
often speaks in terms of criminal “intent” as a form of mens rea in the latter sense. See
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 248 (1952).
126 See DUBBER, MPC, supra note 122, at 32.
127 In any event, categorizing among the three actus reus components is rarely
key to the outcome when applying MPC principles. See id. at 45.
128 If no mens rea is stated, then it is assumed to be recklessness. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(3). With some exceptions, if the statute specifies one level of mens rea, that
level applies to all the elements. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
§ 10.07(C) (6th ed. 2012).
129 See Robinson & Dubber, supra note 122, at 335 (“[T]he Model Penal Code’s
definitions of these four mental states may be the code’s most important contribution to
American criminal law reform.”). The MPC defines the different levels of mens rea depending
on the corresponding form of actus reus. SeeDUBBER,MPC, supra note 122, at 61.
130 See generally DUBBER, MPC supra note 122. A culpable mental state is a
fundamental requirement for culpability under Anglo-American criminal law, though courts
are highly inconsistent when applying that requirement. See Brown, supra note 33, at 109.
131 Despite the MPC’s largely successful effort to modernize and systematize
the criminal law, the Code has had remarkably little influence on the development of
the law of securities fraud in general or insider trading in particular. See Seigel, supra
note 23, at 1566-67.
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proven—the greater the punishment. In utilitarian terms, for
example, negligence is least subject to deterrence and corresponds
to the lowest level of culpability; deterrence is more difficult when
one is not actually aware of a risk. In retributive terms, one who
acts with a purpose to cause harm is more culpable than one
who caused harm by accident.132
Generally, at common law, “intentional” crimes are
committed when the defendant acts with the equivalent of
what the MPC terms “purpose” or “knowledge.”133 On the other
hand, crimes committed recklessly or negligently are considered
to be unintentional.134 As discussed more fully below, securities
fraud is an intentional crime.135 That is, one does not commit
fraud by accident.
Another frequently used common law term is “specific
intent,” a concept that the MPC does not employ.136 Fraud is
generally termed a specific intent, as opposed to a general intent,
crime.137 Courts seem to define “specific intent” temporally; the
fact finder evaluates the actor’s mental state at the time of the
alleged criminal act and queries whether, at that moment, the
actor had the goal of engaging in particular conduct or producing
a particular result in the future.138 This concept is roughly
132 See Moohr, Playing, supra note 25, at 690 (citing Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)).
133 See CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELAHARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
215 (3d. ed. 2014). As the Court explained in Gypsum, “‘[I]t is now generally accepted
that a person who acts (or omits to act) intends a result of his act (or omission) under
two quite different circumstances: (1) when he consciously desires that result, whatever
the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; and (2) when he knows that
the result is practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be
as to that result.’” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978) (quoting
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 196 (1972)) (alteration in original). An equivalent
distinction applies to torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1977).
134 Recklessness and negligence are forms of mens rea that connote risk-taking,
as opposed to purpose and knowledge, which connote intentional activity. See DRESSLER,
supra note 128, at § 10.07(B)(1). Again, tort law follows suit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
135 See infra Part II.B.1; Heminway, supra note 87, at 55 (“Although insider
trading liability may be civil or criminal in nature, the scienter requirement, which
exists in both civil and criminal claims, relies on intentional behavior.”).
136 The concept of specific intent had a tortuous birth. Courts developed the
concept in the 19th century to avoid what seemed to be draconian results in cases involving
voluntary intoxication. Courts began to develop a category of “specific intent” crimes for
which voluntary intoxication would be a defense. See Gideon Yaffe, Intoxication,
Recklessness, and Negligence, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 545 (2012). The distinction between
specific and general intent has never been defined clearly or consistently defined. See Seigel,
supra note 23, at 1564-65 (describing the “massive confusion surrounding” the concepts of
specific and general intent).
137 See infra Part II.B.2.
138 See LEE&HARRIS, supra note 133, at 215. The classic example is common law
burglary: The fact finder must determine whether, at the moment the actor committed the
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equivalent to the MPC concepts of “purpose” and “knowledge.” In
either case, the fact finder must determine whether, at the time of
the act/omission, the actor had the “conscious object” of engaging
in the conduct or producing the result or knew that such conduct
or result were practically certain.139
At this point we also need to consider the concept of
willfulness. Under the principal securities fraud statutes,
willfulness is the sole element that distinguishes criminal from
civil liability.140 Many commentators have attempted to define the
meaning of the term “willfully,” with mixed success at best.141
It is arguable that “willfully” adds virtually nothing to the
government’s burden in a criminal securities fraud case.142 As
noted above, in many instances the only real difference between a
civil and criminal securities fraud case is the burden of proof.143
And as discussed below, all fraud requires intentional behavior.144
In an attempt to give meaning to the term, some courts
and commentators have argued that “willfully” in the criminal
securities fraud context means acting with a conscious awareness
that one is acting wrongfully.145 Words in statutes should be given
meaning, and if willfulness adds nothing to the burden in a
criminal case then the word is basically written out of the statute.
As Professors Buell and Griffin have argued, requiring some
consciousness of wrongdoing—one reading of the willfulness
requirement for criminal securities fraud liability—helps meet
this basic requirement of statutory construction.146
actus reus (breaking and entering the dwelling at night), the actor intended thereafter to
commit a felony once inside the dwelling.
139 See Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at
Common Law and Under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 402 (2001).
140 SeeMoohr, Playing, supra note 25, at 693.
141 See Norwood P. Beveridge, Is Mens Rea Required for a Criminal Violation
of the Federal Securities Laws? 52 BUS. LAW. 35, 37-39 (1996-1997) (describing the
efforts of Professor Louis Loss, the “leading American commentator on the federal
securities laws,” to give meaning to the term “willfully”).
142 See Seigel, supra note 23 at 1604-05 (“Both courts and commentators
disagree as to whether, in [securities] fraud cases, [the willfulness] requirement adds
anything to the analysis.”).
143 SeeMoohr, Stewart, supra note 43, at 600.
144 See infra Part II.B.2.
145 See Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, supra note 32, at 1985; Samuel W. Buell &
Lisa Kern Griffin, On the Mental State of Consciousness of Wrongdoing, 75 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 145 (2012) (“To act with consciousness of wrongdoing would simply
be to act knowing that one is engaged in any sort of moral transgression.”). Such
consciousness helps distinguish aggressive business activities from fraud, see Buell, Novel
Criminal Fraud, supra note 32, at 2032, and ordinary document retention policies from
obstruction of justice, see Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 706 (2005).
146 Buell & Griffin, supra note 145, at 150 (“The actor who is aware of her own
wrongdoing ‘received’ some notice, at least in the sense that she had occasion to consider the
normative significance of her conduct and refrain from it had she wished.”).
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Using the plain language of the statute as the principal
guide,147 Webster’s defines willful as “done deliberately:
intentional.”148 In white collar cases, proving such consciousness
often will not be as straightforward an exercise as it is in cases
involving tangible harm to persons or property. This is one reason
why proof of an intent to harm—as opposed to proof of the
impact of the defendant’s actions—is so important in such
cases.149 A mere intent to mislead or deceive cannot be sufficient
because many business practices not amounting to fraud are
based on exaggerated and even misleading practices.150 The
difference between puffing and fraud, then, must go to the intent
to injure the victim.151
In the securities fraud context, proof of willfulness would
require an intent to defraud the victim, knowing that such fraud
is wrongful.152 Put another way, the government should be
required to prove that the defendant engaged in a scheme that
was designed to produce profit at the expense of the victim—the
person who or entity that suffered the breach of duty.153
Ultimately, the fact finder must choose between competing
narratives to attempt to discern, after the fact, what the actor
was thinking at the time, an imperfect but necessary process in
such adjudications.154
147 See Brown, supra note 33, at 113 (citing United States v. Fisher, 289 F.2d
1329, 1338 (11th Cir. 2005)).
148 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2617 (1986). See
Brown, supra note 33, at n.19 (describing courts’ use of dictionary definitions to
establish mens rea requirements).
149 See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978) (“[A]
defendant’s state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense which
must be established by evidence and inferences drawn therefrom and cannot be taken
from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption of wrongful intent from
proof of an effect on prices.”).
150 See infra Part II.B.1.
151 See United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1182 (2d Cir.
1970) (“[T]he intent of the schemer is to injure another to his own advantage by withholding
or misrepresenting material facts.”).
152 See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 447 (2d Cir. 2014) (“We have
defined willfulness in this context ‘as a realization on the defendant’s part that he was doing
a wrongful act under the securities laws.’”) (quoting United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92,
98 (2d Cir. 2006)); United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1188 (9th Cir. 2004), amended by
413 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Tucker, 345 F.3d 320, 334 (5th Cir. 2003).
153 In MPC terms, this means acting with the purpose—the conscious
objective—to defraud. Cf. Buell, Securities Fraud, supra note 23, at 527 (“Purpose is
therefore necessary to give the concept of deception the moral content it ought to have. If
fraud requires deception and deception requires purpose, then fraud requires purpose.”).
As discussed below, at a minimum, the jury should be required to find that the defendant
acted with either purpose or knowledge. See infra Part III.
154 See Buell & Griffin, supra note 145, at 158.
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Another mens rea level is particularly important for
present purposes: willful blindness, sometimes also termed
conscious avoidance.155 The MPC and common law both provide
that, when proof of knowledge is an element of a crime, proof that
the defendant was willfully blind will suffice.156
In Global-Tech,157 the Supreme Court affirmed both the
viability of willful blindness as a substantive criminal (and civil)
law doctrine and the MPC’s central role in the Court’s criminal law
jurisprudence. The Court held that knowledge is an element of a
cause of action for inducement of patent infringement.158 The Court
also held that the knowledge requirement can be satisfied by proof
of willful blindness. According to the Court, this approach comports
with traditional principles of punishment, under which “defendants
who behave [with willful blindness] are just as culpable as those
who have actual knowledge.”159
In its decision, the Court noted that it has relied upon
MPC mens rea definitions in a number of contexts.160 The MPC
provides that willful blindness meets the requirement of
“knowledge” in criminal statutes, and the vast majority of federal
circuits have agreed.161 Relying upon cases from a number of
circuits, the Court held that to act with willful blindness “(1) the
defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high
155 The concepts are essentially the same. See United States v. Svoboda, 347
F.3d 471, 477-78 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Reyes, 302 F.3d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 2002);
see also Lorelei D. Ritchie, Is “Willful Blindness” the New “Recklessness” After Global-
Tech?, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 165, 186 (2011).
156 MPC § 2.02(7) provides that “[w]hen knowledge of the existence of a particular
fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high
probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.” Arguably,
Global-Tech establishes a more onerous, and more appropriate, test for willful blindness.
See infra Part II.C.
157 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). Although a
civil case, the Court imported criminal law mens rea concepts in its decision. As Justice
Kennedy noted in his dissent, “[t]he Court appears to endorse the willful blindness doctrine
here for all federal criminal cases involving knowledge.” Id. at 2072 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Courts have recognized that the Global-Tech decision has important
implications for criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Goffer, 721 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir.
2013); United States v. Denson, 689 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 996
(2013); United States v. Marsh, 820 F. Supp. 2d 320, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
158 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2065.
159 Id. at 2069 (citing Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 MOD.
L. REV. 294, 302 (1954)).
160 Id.
161 Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7)). The Court noted that “every Court
of Appeals—with the possible exception of the District of Columbia Circuit—has fully
embraced willful blindness, applying the doctrine to a wide range of criminal statutes.”
Id. at 2069-70 n.9 (listing cases).
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probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take
deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”162
For our purposes, the Global-Tech decision is foundational,
for several reasons. First, the Court clearly articulated a willful
blindness test that should now apply in all civil and criminal
federal cases.163 Second, the Court carefully articulated the
distinction between willful blindness and recklessness—a
distinction that, as will be seen below, is often lost on courts in
insider trading cases. Third, the Court set forth a rigorous willful
blindness test—requiring that the defendant take affirmative
steps to avoid learning the truth—that avoids many of the risks of
a weaker willful blindness definition that often seems like just
another version of recklessness.164 This sort of willful blindness
“with teeth” helps allay the concerns that some have articulated
over allowing anything short of actual knowledge to suffice when
proving securities fraud.165
To return to the concept of “intentional” crimes—those
committed with purpose or knowledge—willful blindness puts
us at the lowest level of the proof required for criminal “intent.”
This concept will be key to our discussion of the mens rea
required for white collar crime in general and for insider
trading in particular.166
162 The Court did not define what sort of “deliberate steps” would suffice, and on
its face this requirement appears to add a sub-element that is not present in the tests that
many, perhaps most, circuits have adopted. A number of decisions nonetheless have opined
that Global-Tech did not change the conscious avoidance standard, but merely adopted the
approach used by a majority of circuit courts. See, e.g., Goffer, 721 F.3d at 127-28; United
States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471, 480 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Jinwright v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 843 (2013). Under this reading, making a deliberate decision to turn a
blind eye—the pre-Global-Tech standard—is still sufficient. See United States v. Brooks,
681 F.3d 678, 702 (5th Cir. 2012). It is difficult to believe that the Court would have used
such strong language—requiring “deliberate steps”—without meaning what it said, and a
“deliberate step” does not seem to be the same as a “deliberate decision” to take no action.
See Jeremy Adler, See No Evil: How the Supreme Court’s Decision in Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.: Further Muddles the Intent Element of Induced Infringement,
11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 559, 561 (2013) (arguing that Global-Tech changed the
definition and application of willful blindness); Dane C. Ball, Improving ‘Willful Blindness’
Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases After High Court’s Decision in Global-Tech, 6 CRIM. L.
REP. (BNA) No. 18, at 762 (June 15, 2011); James G. Dilmore, Actual Knowledge of Direct
Patent Infringement Is Required for Induced Infringement: Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v.
SEB S.A., 50 DUQ. L. REV. 659, 676 (2012).
163 See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2070. Again, courts and commentators
disagree as to whether or in what way the Global-Tech decision may have changed the
federal definition of willful blindness. See supra note 162. For an overview of the federal
courts’ conflicting approaches to willful blindness, see United States v. Alston-Graves,
435 F.3d 331, 337-41 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
164 See Adler, supra note 162, at 566-67; Dilmore, supra note 162, at 665-66.
165 See, e.g., Moohr, Playing, supra note 25, at 696.
166 See infra Part III.A.
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Allowing proof of willful blindness to meet the knowledge
element is based upon the normative assumption that a willfully
blind person is as culpable as a person who had actual
knowledge.167 This doctrine also provides prosecutors with an
important tool in cases in which proof of actual knowledge may
present an unfair and insurmountable obstacle to conviction. In
many cases, a defendant can simply deny knowledge, and direct
evidence of actual knowledge may not exist.168 Willful blindness
has played an important role in insider trading cases, in which
defendants often argue that they did not know that the relevant
information was nonpublic information stolen from its source.169
An underlying problem with willful blindness is that, as a
definitional matter, it is often difficult to distinguish from
recklessness, which the MPC defines as awareness of a high
probability that a fact exists.170 Under Global-Tech, to prove willful
blindness the government must show that “(1) the defendant must
subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact
exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid
learning of that fact.”171 Read superficially, these concepts seem
almost indistinguishable. As explained below,172 however, the
question is one of the defendant’s degree of awareness; the jury
must determine, as with any mens rea assessment, the defendant’s
mental state at the time of the act.
The Second Circuit’s high profile Obus decision elucidates
the confusion both between intentional and non-intentional
behavior173 and between the concepts of recklessness and willful
167 See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068-69. The doctrine has its critics, include
Justice Kennedy. Id. at 2072 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Willful blindness is not
knowledge; and judges should not broaden a legislative proscription by analogy.”).
168 The willful blindness standard provides prosecutors with a means of proving
knowledge in, for example, drug possession and trafficking cases where defendants
frequently claim the ignorance defense. See, e.g., United States. v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697,
699 (9th Cir. 1976).
169 See, e.g., United States. v. Goffer, 721 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2013); United States
v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2003). Although the Second Circuit uses the term
“conscious avoidance” rather than willful blindness, the concepts are essentially the same.
See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2070 n.9.
170 As Prof. Langevoort points out, courts in securities fraud cases often define
“recklessness” “to capture the situation akin to conscious avoidance or indifference: the
speaker knows that he does not know the truth, but speaks as if he did.” Donald C.
Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, 2013
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 436-37 (2013).
171 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2070.
172 See infra Part III.A.
173 One commenter has noted that “Obus is required reading for anyone
working in the white collar and securities fraud fields,” because of the attempted
reconciliation of the “supposed conflict between Dirks and Hochfelder.” Ellen Podgor,
Second Circuit Releases Magnum OBUS On Insider Trading, WHITE COLLAR CRIME
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blindness.174 The fundamental error in the Obus decision is its
failure to recognize this basic criminal law distinction. Had the
court paid attention to the Supreme Court’s decision in Global-
Tech distinguishing the two mens rea levels, it would have
avoided this error.
In Obus, the original tipper, Strickland, worked for GE
Capital.175 Allied approached GE Capital about financing
Allied’s potential acquisition of SunSource. GE Capital
assigned Strickland the task of performing due diligence on the
deal. Strickland had a conversation with Black, a college friend
who worked as a securities analyst at Wynnefield Capital, about
the potential acquisition.176 Shortly after that conversation, Black
spoke with Obus, Wynnefield’s principal and Black’s boss.177 Two
weeks later, Wynnefield bought a substantial additional amount
of SunSource stock.178
The SEC filed an insider trading complaint against
Strickland, Black, and Obus. Under the misappropriation theory,
the SEC alleged that Strickland breached his duty to his employer
by relaying his employer’s confidential information to Black.179 The
district court granted the defendant’s summary judgment
motion,180 but the Second Circuit vacated and remanded.
In its opinion, the Second Circuit began by noting that
the mens rea for securities fraud requires proof of “‘intent to
PROF BLOG (Sept. 6, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/
2012/09/second-circuit-releases-magnum-obus-on-insider trading.html.
174 See United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 342 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(observing that the district court confused the concepts of willful blindness and
recklessness). Cf. United States v. Precision Medical Labs., Inc., 593 F.2d 434, 446 (2d Cir.
1978) (“The phrases ‘reckless disregard of whether the statements made were true’ and
‘conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth’ mean essentially the same thing.”); see also
United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that the lower court’s
conscious avoidance instruction was misstated and there was risk that a jury could have
convicted defendant if he was merely negligent.); Moohr, Playing, supra note 25, at 696
(describing courts’ “shading of knowing conduct into reckless conduct.”).
175 SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 275, 279 (2d. Cir. 2012).
176 Strickland’s “tasks included analyzing SunSource’s financial performance,
but the parties dispute whether Strickland was authorized to gather information about
SunSource’s management.” Id. at 279. The defendants asserted that the conversation
was part of Strickland’s due diligence work, a characterization that the SEC contested.
Id. at 290. It may be that the lack of clear proof as to the contents of this conversation
was one reason why the government chose not to bring criminal charges.
177 After Allied’s acquisition of SunSource was announced, Wynnefield netted
a paper profit of over $1.3 million. Id. at 282.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 283. The SEC also alleged a traditional theory case, which it later
dropped on appeal. Id. at 283.
180 Id. at 284 (citing SEC v. Obus, No. 06 Civ. 3150, 2010 WL 3703846, at *16
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010)). The trial court also found that, because GE Capital’s own
internal investigation had concluded that Strickland had not breached a duty to his
employer, there was no breach. Id. at 291.
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deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’”181 The court then noted that,
although the Dirks “should know” language sounds like
negligence, such a standard is inappropriate in a securities fraud
case under Hochfelder.182 The court observed that a number of
circuits, including the Second Circuit, have held that
recklessness may suffice:
[W]e have held that scienter “may be established through a showing
of reckless disregard for the truth, that is, conduct which is highly
unreasonable and which represents an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care” . . . . In every insider trading case, at the
moment of tipping or trading, just as in securities fraud cases across
the board, the unlawful actor must know or be reckless in not
knowing that the conduct was deceptive.183
The language “must know or be reckless in not knowing” ignores
the three distinct mental states that the Court recognized in
Global-Tech: actual knowledge, willful blindness equating to
actual knowledge, and recklessness.184
As discussed above,185 the concepts of willful blindness
and recklessness are indeed difficult to distinguish. But in
terms of culpability, the distinction is crucial. A willfully blind
defendant is acting with the equivalent of knowledge, and
therefore is acting “intentionally” in common law terms.186 A
reckless defendant is only acting with an awareness of a risk,
and therefore is acting unintentionally in common law terms.187
The distinction between actual awareness of a fact, and
awareness of the mere possibility that a fact exists, is critical.
181 Id. at 286 (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 & n.12.).
182 Id. (quoting SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir. 1998)) (emphasis
added) (internal citations omitted).
183 Id.
184 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068-71 (2011).
185 See supra Part II.A.
186 In MPC terms, “[a] person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of
an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically
certain that his conduct will cause such a result.”MODELPENALCODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1985).
187 In MPC terms, on the other hand,
a person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor’s situation.
Id. at § 2.02(2)(c).
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The Supreme Court made this very point in Global-Tech,188
articulating a willful blindness standard that is more easily
distinguishable from mere recklessness than the standard that
courts typically apply. Drawing such distinctions is not an easy
task, but it is a task that juries must undertake all the time.
The Obus decision’s omission of willful blindness simply
muddies the water. Had the court stated that the unlawful
actor must know or be actually aware of the high likelihood
that the act is deceptive, but turn a blind eye to that fact, then
we would have a precisely drawn description of the mental
state that would comport with the nature of securities fraud as
just that—a form of fraud. As discussed in the previous section,
Newman similarly conflated mens rea concepts—in that case,
the concepts of willful blindness and negligence.
As the leading federal appeals court on securities law,
the Second Circuit sets standards followed by federal courts
around the country.189 The decision’s use of such imprecise and
misleading mens rea standards shows exactly why we need a
new, systematic articulation of the mens rea of insider trading.
B. Insider Trading as an Intentional Offense
As a matter of both law and policy, courts should recognize
that insider trading is a crime that requires intentional behavior.
Insider trading prohibitions seek to regulate business activities.
It is therefore essential to define the crime as carefully as
possible, both to provide fair warning of illegality and to avoid
regulatory creep at the bounds of permissible conduct. The
Supreme Court has determined, consistently, that the best way
to accomplish this goal is by situating insider trading within the
boundaries of fraud.190
1. Insider Trading as a Business and Regulatory Offense
When defining the mens rea elements of business and
regulatory offenses, the essential nature of these crimes helps
ascertain the appropriate level of mens rea. Unlike crimes
involving readily ascertainable harm to persons or property, these
188 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070-71 (2011).
189 See Roberta S. Karmel, The Second Circuit’s Role in Expanding the SEC’s
Jurisdiction Abroad, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 743, 743 (1991).
190 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980) (“[O]ne who fails to
disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud
only when he is under a duty to do so.”).
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offenses often seek to draw the difficult line between acceptable
and unacceptable business behavior. In such contexts, as the
courts have recognized in areas including antitrust and mail
fraud, requiring that the defendant acted intentionally is one
principal way of drawing this line. Most white collar offenses fall
within the category of specific intent crimes.191 By definition,
these crimes—under either the common law or MPC
definitions—are intentional rather than accidental crimes.192
For example, in United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., the
Court addressed the mens rea requirements of the Sherman Act’s
criminal provisions. Initially, the Supreme Court focused on the
fundamental due process concerns that underlie much of white
collar criminalization: a criminal law must (1) provide fair notice
to potential defendants and (2) serve to limit prosecutorial
abuses.193 The Court emphasized the “indeterminacy of the
Sherman Act’s standards” when assessing whether criminal
intent should be required for conviction.194 In language at least
equally applicable to insider trading laws, the Court stated: “‘The
Sherman Act, inevitably perhaps, is couched in language broad
and general . . . . Thus, it may be difficult for today’s businessman
to tell in advance whether projected actions will run afoul of the
Sherman Act’s criminal strictures.’”195
In an oft-quoted passage, the Court remarked that “the
behavior proscribed by the [Sherman] Act is often difficult to
distinguish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and
economically justifiable business conduct.”196 The same observation
applies to insider trading law. Compare this passage with the
following passage from Dirks:
191 For example, bribery requires offering or giving something of value to a
federal public official with the specific intent that the official engage in a federal official
act in exchange. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 53, at 172. Mail fraud
requires that the defendant use the federal mails with the specific intent that a victim
be deprived of money, property, or honest services. Id. at 78.
192 To take bribery as just one example, one cannot accidentally give money
with the expectation that an official will do something in return, see id. at 182, or
accidentally scheme with the goal so that a victim will be deprived of money, property,
or honest services, see id. at 68.
193 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co, 438 U.S. 422, 446 n.22 (1978).
194 Id. at 439.
195 Id. (quoting Report of the Attorney General’s National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws 439 (1955)).
196 Id. at 440-41. In another important passage directly applicable to insider
trading, the Court stated that interpreting the law too broadly “holds out the distinct
possibility of overdeterrence; salutary and procompetitive conduct lying close to the
borderline of impermissible conduct might be shunned by businessmen who chose to be
excessively cautious in the face of uncertainty regarding possible exposure to criminal
punishment for even a good-faith error of judgment.” Id. at 441.
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Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain [from trading] solely because a
person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an
insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the
role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary
to the preservation of a healthy market.197
Relying heavily on the MPC, the Court in Gypsum then
addressed two specific issues: whether some level of criminal
intent is necessary for a criminal antitrust violation and, if so,
what specific level of mens rea is required. The relevant statute
did not on its face require any proof of mens rea, and the
Court—as is so often true when interpreting white collar
offenses—essentially had to fill in the statutory gaps.198
The Court initially rejected the trial court’s instruction to
the jury that it could presume that the defendants intended to
engage in anticompetitive behavior if their actions had an
anticompetitive effect—in essence, a strict liability instruction.199
The Court then turned to the specific MPC definitions: “the Code
enumerates four possible levels of intent—purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence.”200 Significantly, for present
purposes, the Court concluded that, “[i]n dealing with the kinds of
business decisions upon which the antitrust laws focus, the
concepts of recklessness and negligence have no place.”201 In other
words, when trying to distinguish between illegal and legal
business activities, where the line between the two is often
murky, it is illogical and even potentially dangerous to impose
criminal liability based upon mens rea levels that equate with
unintentional activity.202 To be deemed criminal, anti-competitive
activity must be intentional, not accidental.203
Here, there are interesting parallels between
anticompetitive practices and insider trading. Laws governing
each activity have the broader goals of ensuring that the
197 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
198 Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422 at 443 (“As we have noted, the language of the Act
provides minimal assistance in determining what standard of intent is appropriate.”).
199 438 U.S. at 436 (“We are unwilling to construe the Sherman Act as mandating
a regime of strict-liability criminal offenses.”).
200 Id. at 444.
201 Id.
202 This aspect of the Gypsum decision is discussed more fully below, infra
Part II.B.2.
203 The Court then decided whether the level of intent required should be purpose or
knowledge. First, the Court concluded that “action undertaken with knowledge of its probable
consequences and having the requisite anticompetitive effects can be a sufficient predicate for a
finding of criminal liability under the antitrust laws.” Id. (emphasis added). Second, the Court
also decided that, in cases where anticompetitive effects have not been proven, the government
must show that the defendant acted with the purpose of causing such effects. Id. at 477 n.21.
In both cases, then, the Court required proof of intentional behavior.
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markets function fairly. Such market-focused policy goals
necessarily risk ensnaring activity that is not obviously criminal
and that might actually be desirable. As one commentator noted,
the securities laws, “like the antitrust laws, cover a great body of
legitimate business activity, through which the line between
accepted and proscribed behavior frequently is hard to draw.”204
2. Insider Trading as Fraud
Building upon the Court’s reasoning in Gypsum, in the
context of fraud in general or insider trading in particular, it
makes little sense in terms of law or policy to employ mens rea
concepts that connote accidental crimes. Fraud is defined in
terms of intentionality—scheming to obtain something of value
from a victim.205 Black’s Law Dictionary’s principal definition of
fraud is “[a] knowing misrepresentation or knowing concealment
of a material fact made to induce another to act to his or her
detriment.”206 In this sense, fraud is a form of theft, a classic
“specific intent” crime.207 And the intentional nature of fraud
applies to both civil and criminal fraud.208
The crimes of mail and wire fraud have strong parallels to
securities fraud; the securities laws’ principal antifraud provision,
Section 10b, was modeled on the federal mail fraud statute,209 and
the Supreme Court has held that mail fraud is grounded in
common law fraud.210 An inchoate offense, the mail or wire fraud
scheme must be designed to deprive the victim of money, property,
or honest services, but need not succeed for the defendant to be
liable.211 Under these statutes, money and property interests
include intangible interests such as confidential business
204 Beveridge, supra note 141, at 64.
205 This is true in both the civil and criminal context. See infra Part II.C.
206 Fraud, BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).
207 See DRESSLER, supra note 128, § 10.06.
208 See Buell, Securities Fraud, supra note 23, at 538-39.
209 See United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 2004)) (“[L]ike[
][mail fraud], a defendant may be convicted of committing securities fraud only if the
government proves specific intent to defraud, mislead, or deceive.”), amended by 413 F.3d
928 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2012),
aff’d, 555 F. App’x. 98 (2d Cir. 2014) (Summary Order) (unpublished opinion), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 352 (Nov. 10, 2014).
210 SeeMcNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987).
211 STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 53, at 66.
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information.212 The duty to provide honest services derives from a
fiduciary duty or its equivalent, as under Section 10b.213
The mail and wire fraud statutes often work in tandem
with the securities fraud statutes; insider trading indictments
often contain parallel mail/wire fraud charges under the
deprivation of property theory and/or the honest services
theory.214 And as one commentator has noted, “statutory crimes
based in common-law offenses are presumed to carry common-
law culpability requirements even when the statute includes no
such term.”215 As an inchoate offense, mail/wire fraud “is similar
to an attempt, and requires a similar level of culpability:
knowing conduct (deception) undertaken with the purpose of
defrauding or harming the victim.”216 Absent such proof, a
defendant cannot be liable.217
One well-known wire fraud case, United States v.
Czubinski, illustrates this point.218 The defendant was an IRS
employee who used interstate computer connections (hence, the
use of the wires) to view confidential taxpayer information in
violation of IRS policies. The government charged him with
defrauding the IRS of both its intangible property interest in
the confidential taxpayer information and the honest services
that the defendant owed the IRS as its employee.
The First Circuit reversed, holding that merely gaining
access to confidential information does not amount to fraud;
the defendant must plan to use the information in a way that
would somehow benefit the defendant or harm the IRS.219 The
government did not offer any such proof. Therefore, the defendant
212 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987) (“We have little trouble
in holding that the conspiracy here to trade on the Journal’s confidential information is
not outside the reach of the mail and wire fraud statutes.”).
213 See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2930 (2010) (stating that the
“solid core” of the honest-service doctrine is a “violation of a fiduciary duty”).
214 See, e.g., id. at 2908; United States v. Goffer, 721 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2013);
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
215 See Brown, supra note 33, at 113.
216 Moohr, Playing, supra note 25, at 695 (noting that courts sometimes do not
articulate the mens rea correctly, conflating the intent to deceive with the intent to defraud,
that is, with the intent to use the deception to harm the victim); see also Geraldine Szott
Moohr,Mail Fraud Meets Criminal Theory, 67 U.CIN. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1998).
217 See United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 694 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Essential
to a conviction under the ‘scheme to defraud’ clause of the mail fraud statute is a showing of
fraudulent intent: i.e., intent to deceive and intent to cause actual harm.”).
218 United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1077 (1st Cir. 1997).
219 Id. at 1075 (“[W]ithout evidence that Czubinski used or intended to use the
taxpayer information (beyond mere browsing), an intent to deprive [the IRS of
property] cannot be proven, and, a fortiori, a scheme to defraud is not shown.”).
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did not violate his duty of honest services to his employer and did
not deprive his employer of its property.220
Citing Carpenter, the court also stated that “confidential
information may constitute intangible ‘property’ and . . . its
unauthorized dissemination or other use may deprive the owner
of its property rights.”221 The citation to Carpenter is telling, for
certainly there would have been no insider trading case on the
Carpenter facts if the reporter had engaged in “unauthorized
dissemination” by simply discussing the contents of his Wall
Street Journal column with others instead of actually profiting
from the disclosure. And as argued below, since both mail fraud
and securities fraud are specific intent crimes, the reporter should
only be liable if he intended that the persons to whom he disclosed
would use the information. Disclosure without intent to use
cannot constitute the required intent to harm the source of the
information.222 As the Court held in Dirks, fiduciary duties forbid
agents from “using undisclosed corporate information to their
advantage.”223 Although perhaps the reporter would violate
workplace rules by such a casual conversation, the appropriate
remedy would be to punish, fire, or sue the reporter, but not send
him to jail.224
Securities fraud law, like mail and wire fraud law, is
replete with proof that such intentionality is required for liability.
For example, in securities fraud cases, as in mail and wire fraud
cases, the general rule is that a good faith defense, such as
reliance on professional advice, negates proof of mens rea.225 Why
should this be so? If a defendant knowingly traded on material
nonpublic information, why should reliance on counsel be a
defense? The answer is that the defendant, in addition to
possessing the information, must believe that the information was
220 Id. at 1077 (“[T]he government has failed to prove that Czubinski intended
to use the IRS files he browsed for any private purposes, and hence his actions,
however reprehensible, do not rise to the level of a scheme to defraud his employer of
his honest services.”).
221 Id. at 1074 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987)).
222 See id. at 1074-75.
223 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983) (emphasis added); see Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading
Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1995) (“[T]he mere fact of a tip is not
sufficient to result in liability. What is proscribed is . . . a breach of the duty of loyalty imposed
on all fiduciaries to avoid personally profiting from information entrusted to them.”).
224 See Coffee, Hush, supra note 62, at 123.
225 See, e.g., United States v. Walters, 913 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1990) (reversing
defendant’s mail fraud conviction in part because of the lack of a good faith defense
instruction); see also Buell & Griffin, supra note 145, at 137 (“[G]ood faith reliance on advice
of counsel negates a mens rea element if that element is one of ‘specific intent.’”).
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wrongfully obtained. If a lawyer told the defendant that the trade
would be legal, then this element is missing.226
When affirming criminal insider trading liability based
upon misappropriation in O’Hagan, the Supreme Court implicitly
and explicitly recognized much of the foregoing analysis.227 That
is, the Court both emphasized that mens rea is an important
component in limiting the scope of the crime and incorporated
common law fraud principles in its analysis.228 The Court stated
that “[v]ital to our decision that criminal liability may be sustained
under the misappropriation theory, we emphasize, are two sturdy
safeguards Congress has provided regarding scienter.”229 First, the
Court noted that, “[t]o establish a criminal violation of Rule 10b–5,
the government must prove that a person ‘willfully’ violated the
provision.”230 Unfortunately, the Court did not expound upon its
understanding of this notoriously vague term. But by emphasizing
the substantial burden of proving willfulness as a way of limiting
the scope of the misappropriation theory, the Court at least implied
that the government must show that the defendant acted
intentionally. The Court in fact stated that “‘the presence of
culpable intent as a necessary element of the offense’” provides an
important limitation on the scope of the offense.231
Significantly, the Court tied the mens rea element to the
breach of duty element. Responding to criticism over the
potential breadth of the misappropriation theory, the Court
emphasized that “the theory is limited to those who breach a
recognized duty.”232 Given that the Court linked the culpability
requirement with the breach of duty requirement, it is
reasonable to infer that the government must show that the
defendant acted intentionally with respect to the breach.233
226 See, e.g., United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 853 (10th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097, 1100 (3d Cir. 1992). Reliance on professional
advice requires that the defendant have fully disclosed all relevant information and
have acted in good faith. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 53, at 104.
227 In this portion of the opinion, the Court responds to Justice Thomas’s
dissent, which criticized the misappropriation rule as lacking a “coherent and consistent”
underlying theory and as “open-ended.” United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 680-92
(1997) (Thomas J., dissenting).
228 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665-66.
229 Id. at 665.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 666 (quoting Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337,
342 (1952)).
232 Id.
233 See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444 (1978) (“[T]he
concepts of recklessness and negligence have no place” when discussing liability based
upon complex business regulations).
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Because fraud requires some intentional act or omission
on the actor’s part, with insider trading in particular we need to
identify the intended injury precisely in order to define the crime:
what is the harm that the actor intends to cause? It is not difficult
to articulate harms attached to breaches of duty. Under the
traditional theory, shareholders expect that corporate officers and
directors will act in the shareholders’ interests and not in their
own self-interests.234 Presumably, self-dealing actually harms
shareholders by giving an unjustifiably larger slice of the
corporation’s economic pie to the self-dealer.235
The injury is perhaps more articulable in misappropriation
cases. This is true in every major reported case; the breach of trust
by an attorney or employee, for instance, usually produces at least
a theoretical tangible harm. In O’Hagan, for example, clients
would certainly hesitate before hiring a law firm whose partners
knowingly use confidential client information to their benefit. The
client may suffer a direct financial harm: if a misappropriator
buys stock in the target, the price of the deal may rise, making
the transaction more expensive for the acquiring company.236 The
firm’s reputation and business will also likely be harmed once the
misappropriation becomes public. In Carpenter, the Wall Street
Journal’s reputation for neutral financial information would be
undermined if its readers knew that reporters were trading on
their columns in advance; readers would likely conclude, correctly
or not, that information in the columns is not reliable.237
C. Defining the “Intent” of Insider Trading
Insider trading is a form of fraud. Under the common law,
fraud is generally considered a specific intent crime: in the classic
formulation, the defendant’s goal is to make a misrepresentation
(or material omission if there is a duty) that the victim will rely
upon to the victim’s detriment.238 In a straightforward securities
234 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (“[A] relationship of trust
and confidence [exists] between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have
obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that corporation.”).
235 See Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Investors in Controlled Firms Value Insider
Trading Laws - International Evidence, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 267, 267 (2007-2008)
(“[S]tringent insider trading laws and enforcement are associated with greater
corporate valuation.”).
236 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653; see also SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758, 769
(7th Cir. 2013).
237 As the Second Circuit noted, the misappropriation scheme “threatened to
harm the Journal’s reputation for professionalism and integrity.” United States v.
Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1035 (2d Cir. 1986).
238 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-28.
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fraud case, for example, a seller lies about the financial condition
of the company in order to bolster the stock price with the intent
that the buyer pay more for the stock than it is worth.
With insider trading, however, the harm is not always
to the person with whom the defendant is trading. Rather, the
harm may instead result from the breach of duty owed the
owner of the information. The nature of the fiduciary duties
and “their equivalent”239 that fall within the ambit of securities
fraud has been the subject of a great deal of discussion and
debate. Whatever the outer boundaries of those duties, and the
conduct that constitutes breaches of those duties, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that such breaches are required for
insider trading liability, under both the misappropriation and
traditional theories.
Simply put, the putative thief—whether an insider
and/or misappropriator—must act with the intent of taking the
information from its owner and using it to benefit the thief.
Because the nature of the property interest may be intangible,
it is often more difficult to conceptualize the specific intent here
than when the fraudster schemes to obtain the victim’s money.
But the property owner’s right to the exclusive use of the
intangible property interest is an interest that underlies much
of the federal law of fraud.
The key case is Carpenter. There, the Supreme Court held
that the defendants “cannot successfully contend . . . that a
scheme to defraud requires a monetary loss, such as giving the
information to a competitor; it is sufficient that the [Wall Street
Journal] has been deprived of its right to exclusive use of the
information, for exclusivity is an important aspect of confidential
business information and most private property for that
matter.”240 Courts have repeatedly used Carpenter’s holding to
elucidate the interests at stake in insider trading cases.241
The Supreme Court made this point explicitly in O’Hagan.
The Court began by citing Carpenter for the principle that “an
employee’s undertaking not to reveal his employer’s confidential
information ‘became a sham’ when the employee provided the
information to his co-conspirators in a scheme to obtain trading
239 United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1991).
240 Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1987). This holding was controversial at the
time because of its potential for a vast expansion of the scope of the federal mail and
wire fraud statutes. See Coffee, Hush, supra note 62, at 121-24. But it is now settled
law. See, e.g., United States v. Adler, 186 F.3d 574, 576-77 (4th Cir. 1999).
241 See, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 233-34 (2d Cir. 2001)
(citing Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1033).
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profits.”242 As discussed above, Carpenter held that confidential
business information is a form of property the deprivation of
which may damage its owner.243 And here is the core O’Hagan
holding, which derives directly from Carpenter: “The undisclosed
misappropriation of such information, in violation of a fiduciary
duty . . . constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement—‘the fraudulent
appropriation to one’s own use of the money or goods entrusted to
one’s care by another.’”244
Finally, the Court in O’Hagan confirmed that the theft
is not complete until the thief uses the information without
disclosing that use: “To satisfy the common law rule that a
trustee may not use the property that [has] been entrusted [to]
him, there would have to be consent. To satisfy the
requirement of the Securities Act that there be no deception,
there would only have to be disclosure.”245 The core harm, then,
is the use plus the omission to disclose.246 Of course, the
abstain-or-disclose rule also applies to the traditional theory
under Cady Roberts and its progeny.247
If we import MPC language, as the Court has frequently
done in various contexts,248 then the government must show that
an insider or misappropriator acted either purposely or
knowingly. That is, that the insider or misappropriator acted with
either (1) the conscious goal of breaching a duty to the company
and its shareholders or to the owner of the information,
respectively, or (2) an awareness that the theft of the information
almost certainly constituted such a breach.
Under this formulation, willful blindness would also be
sufficient. This would meet the essential goal of insider trading
law: to protect principals from the nefarious acts of their agents
and their agents’ cohorts. It is appropriate to cast this net to
include those who are almost certain that (1) the information they
possess is secret information that belongs to the principal and (2)
that using the information would violate the agent’s duty to the
principal. Although we could make a strong argument that willful
242 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997).
243 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26.
244 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654 (citing Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27).
245 Id. at 654 (quoting Oral Argument transcript) (alterations in original).
246 Id. at 655 (“[F]ull disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation
theory: Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning
fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans
to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b)
violation—although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under state law for
breach of a duty of loyalty.”).
247 See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
248 See Global-Tech discussion, supra Part II.A.
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blindness should not suffice for a specific intent crime,249 the
pragmatic considerations running in favor of a willful blindness
standard are deeply rooted in the law—and may well explain
courts’ mistaken and misleading tendency to employ a
recklessness standard in insider trading cases.250
In this framework, recklessness is not an appropriate
level of mens rea for any element of insider trading. As should
be apparent from the above discussion, and as others have
argued,251 recklessness is a non-intentional level of mens rea that
is fundamentally at odds with an intentional offense such as
insider trading.252 Harm caused by reckless behavior is, by
definition, non-intentional under generally accepted concepts of
criminal mens rea. The common law defines intentional behavior
as acting with the goal of causing the harm or knowing that the
harm will almost certainly happen; acting with knowledge of a
mere risk is non-intentional.253 Unfortunately, in the securities
fraud context, the Court’s earlier decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder failed to use the precise distinctions that the Court
employed in Gypsum and thus added to the confusion over the
mens rea of securities fraud.254 In Ernst & Ernst, the Court held
that negligence is not the appropriate mental state in a private
civil securities fraud case for damages. Rather, the Court held,
the defendant must have acted with “an intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.”255 But the Court contributed to the
249 See Moohr, Playing, supra note 25, at 696 (“The lack of uniformity and the
shading of knowing conduct into reckless conduct makes willful blindness a poor
substitute for a knowing mens rea.”). As argued above, supra Part II.A, the Global-Tech
definition of willful blindness should alleviate many of these concerns.
250 Others have recognized that courts often confuse the two concepts. See
Moohr, Playing, supra note 25, at 696 (describing “the shading of knowing conduct into
reckless conduct”).
251 See, e.g., Buell, Securities Fraud, supra note 23, at 564 (“[I]f [an actor] is
merely reckless as to whether she has an illegitimate informational advantage, then she
is perhaps misleading her counterparty, but she is not defrauding her counterparty in the
core sense of fraud.”).
252 Cf. id. at 515 (“If one believes that fraud is a morally charged concept that
requires that an actor seek to deceive another . . . no such thing as no-fault fraud,
negligent fraud, or arguably even reckless fraud can exist.”).
253 See DRESSLER, supra note 128, at § 10.04(A)(1) (explaining that intentional
crimes are committed purposely or knowingly). In terms of homicide law, for example, at
common law criminal negligence or ordinary recklessness will typically produce
manslaughter liability. Extreme recklessness may give rise to second degree “depraved
heart” murder. But these are all forms of non-intentional killings, which the law
distinguishes from intentional killings, that is, those done with a subjective awareness
that the act will almost certainly produce death or with the conscious goal that it will do
so. SeeMODEL PENALCODE §§ 210.1-4; DRESSLER, supra note 128, at § 31.02(A).
254 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, n.12 (1976) (conflating
intentional and reckless conduct).
255 Id. at 193.
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mens rea confusion by referring to “recklessness” as a form of
“intentional conduct,” a fundamentally illogical equation, and
then stating that it was not deciding whether recklessness might
suffice in the kind of case before the Court.256 Later in the opinion,
however, the Court evidenced a more accurate understanding of
scienter’s meaning by focusing on the text of Rule 10b(5). The
Court noted that statutory or regulatory “words such as
‘manipulative,’ ‘devise,’ and ‘contrivance,’ proscribe a type of
conduct quite different from negligence.”257 The Court went on to
examine these terms, concluding that they connote a sort of
intentionality inapposite to negligence258 and—we might say, by
way of natural inference—to recklessness as another mental state
connoting non-intentional conduct. Indeed, the Court noted that
Section 10(b) speaks “specifically in terms of manipulation and
deception, and of implementing devices and contrivances—the
commonly understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing.”259
For example, a tippee who did not act intentionally with
respect to the core harm—the tipper’s theft of information from
one to whom the tipper owed a duty—should not be sanctioned.
Consider the analogous case of a child who, after a parent’s
admonition to slow down, runs through a house, bumps into a
table, and knocks over and breaks a valuable vase. The child is
aware of the risk, but proceeds nonetheless; in criminal mens rea
terms, this is an accident committed recklessly—with awareness
of risk but without the intent that the vase break.260 Now take
the case of a child who angrily picks up the vase and smashes it
to the floor; this child intended to break the vase. Instinctively,
we feel that the second child is more culpable.
256 See id. at 193 n.12. The opinion thus left the door open for lower courts to
adopt a recklessness standard for securities fraud. Twelve circuits have upheld some form
of recklessness as a basis for securities fraud liability; the majority of courts cite a
Seventh Circuit decision, Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45
(7th Cir. 1977). Although most courts do apply a recklessness standard, they vary on how
they define the term. SeeMoohr, Playing, supra note 25, at 696.
257 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199 (“Use of the word ‘manipulative’ is especially
significant . . . . It connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud
investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities.”) (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
258 Id. The Court found support for this conclusion in the legislative history:
Section 10(b) “was described rightly as a ‘catchall’ clause to enable the Commission ‘to
deal with new manipulative (or cunning) devices,’” language that does not connote
negligence. Id. at 202.
259 Id. at 214 (emphasis added). See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
473 (1977) (“The language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to
prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception.”).
260 See supra note 134 (discussing recklessness).
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Drawing from Supreme Court precedent in the context of
business and regulatory offenses in general and fraud in
particular, all elements of insider trading should require
intentional behavior. Unfortunately, largely because of the
confusion that Hochfelder created, lower federal courts have
employed inaccurate and misleading mens rea standards in
insider trading cases. Even the Newman opinion, which did much
to clarify the mens rea elements of tipper and tippee liability,
confused constructive knowledge and negligence.
To recap, insider trading requires proof of intentionality.
Insider trading is a classic “gray-area” white collar crime, the
boundaries of which are uncertain. The indefinite nature of the
crime supports the conclusion that no mens rea equated with non-
intentionality (recklessness and negligence) should ever suffice for
an insider trading conviction. This comports with insider trading’s
grounding in common law fraud, a theoretical construct from
which the United States Supreme Court has never wavered in all
its insider trading decisions.
III. SYSTEMATIZING INSIDER TRADING
Based upon a conception of insider trading as grounded
in common law fraud, this article next identifies the precise
levels of mens rea that attach to each of the actus reus elements
of insider trading. This task is most complex when dealing with
tippers and tippees, particularly when there are remote (second
and third level) tippees.
A. Matching the Mens Rea and Actus Reus Elements of
Insider Trading
Based upon the case law, it should be clear that insider
trading liability requires three basic actus reus components: (1)
the possession of material nonpublic information; (2) the
purchase or sale of a security; and (3) the breach of duty. Each
requires a unique analysis to determine the requisite level of
mens rea that should attach to give rise to criminal liability.
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1. Possession of Material Nonpublic Information
To be guilty of insider trading an actor must possess
material nonpublic information.261 To ensure that the actor is
culpable, the government should be required to prove that the
actor knowingly possessed the information and knew that the
information was material and nonpublic. Otherwise, the
defendant’s act could have been purely innocent; if the actor does
not know that the information is material and nonpublic, then the
actor does not know that trading on the information is harmful.
This rule should apply both to misappropriators and insiders
acting as principals who trade, and to tippers and tippees.
The knowledge requirement is based on core culpability
principles. One of the Supreme Court’s leading mens rea
decisions, Morissette v. United States, illustrates the importance
of requiring knowledge as to a core element.262 In that case, the
defendant found and took some abandoned shell casings while
hunting. He was convicted under a statute that provided,
“‘whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts’
government property is punishable by fine and imprisonment.”263
In a “canonical” decision,264 the Court applied the mens
rea term “knowingly” to the circumstance element of the crime
(that the property actually be “property of the United States”)
as well as to the active conduct element (the conversion).265 The
Court reasoned that, if the defendant knowingly converted the
property believing it to have been abandoned, then he did not
act culpably.266 And in a series of other cases, the Court has
held that mens rea requirements should apply to all of the
actus reus elements of criminal statutes.267
261 These basic actus reus elements are non-controversial, with one exception.
Courts have disagreed as to whether mere possession of material nonpublic information
when trading is sufficient, or whether the government must prove that the defendant
actually used the information. In 2000, the SEC enacted Rule 10b5-1, which adopts the
“knowing possession” standard; however, some courts apparently have continued to require
proof of use. See Anello & Albert, Revisiting, supra note 5; Langevoort, supra note 170, at
439. Because the Second Circuit has consistently applied the knowing possession standard,
I assume for purposes of this article that this is the correct standard.
262 Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952).
263 Id. at 248 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 641).
264 Brown, supra note 33, at 110 n.6.
265 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 270-72 (requiring “knowing conversion”).
266 Id. at 250 (“The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in
mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and
duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.”).
267 See Traps, supra note 124, at 631-35.
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This conclusion is particularly compelling when the
circumstance is a core culpability element. In Morissette, the
defendant was not culpable if he was unaware that the property
belonged to another.268 In insider trading, by way of analogy, the
defendant is not culpable if the defendant honestly believes that
the information is public.269
To illustrate this point, let us consider the following
scenario. If two friends are having a conversation, and work-
related matters happen to arise, then it is easy to see how one
person might casually share secret business information with
the other person. If the other person trades on that information
believing that it is not secret, then that person has not acted
with the sort of fraudulent intent underlying the crime.
Similarly, if the other person believes that the information is
unimportant and therefore immaterial, then that person lacks
the necessary culpability.270 Of course, the jury must find both
circumstance elements—that the information was indeed both
material and nonpublic—beyond a reasonable doubt, but the
question is the mens rea that attaches to each element. To
draw an analogy, the crime of selling stolen property that you
have obtained from another is akin to the crime of trading on
material nonpublic information that you received from another.
If you do not know that the property is stolen, then you lack
culpability;271 if you do not know that the information was
obtained in breach of a duty, then you lack culpability.
Under both general common law and MPC principles
relating to intentional crime, if the jury were to find that the
tippee was merely aware of some possibility that the information
was secret—that the tippee was reckless—then the tippee
should not be liable. If the jury were to find that the defendant
knew that the information almost certainly was secret, but
268 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 270-72.
269 Traps, supra note 124, at 636 (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419
(1985) (noting that in Liparota the Court held that in prosecution for unlawful use of food
stamps, the government must prove that the defendant knew that his possession of food
stamps was not authorized by law or regulation));see also Flores-Figueroa v. United
States, 556 U.S. 646, 657 (2009) (holding that in a prosecution for possessing means of
identification of another person, the government must prove that the defendant knew the
means of identification belonged to another person); United States v. X-Citement Video,
Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68 (1994) (holding that in a prosecution for transportation of child
pornography, the government must prove that the defendant had knowledge that the
pornography involved underage participants). For another analysis of Flores-Figueroa,
see Brown, supra note 33, at 120.
270 The materiality element is usually easy to meet; if the defendant traded on the
information, it will be hard for the defense to convince a jury that the defendant believed
that a reasonable investor would not want to know the information.
271 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 272 n.32.
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deliberately decided not to ascertain the nature of the
information, then the defendant knowingly possessed the
information and acted with intentionality.
Courts seldom seem to be able to articulate this insider
trading element—the mens rea with respect to possession of
material nonpublic information—with any precision. Again
consider Obus,272 which offers a muddled mens rea definition on
the possession element for both tippers and tippees.
On the possession element of tippee liability, the court
described the mental state that the SEC was required to show as
to the ultimate tippee, Obus. The court held that the jury should
be required to find that the “tippee intentionally or recklessly
traded while in knowing possession of that information.”273 On its
face, the sentence does not make sense; one cannot “recklessly”
trade securities, that is, one cannot merely be aware of the
possibility that one is trading.
Presumably, the court meant to require that the tippee
must know or be reckless as to the possession of material,
nonpublic information. Attaching recklessness—a mens rea level
denoting unintentional behavior—to the possession element
makes no sense in the context of possession of nonpublic
information. Knowing that you are trading on secret information
is the essence of insider trading. If you merely suspect that you
might be trading on secret information, or merely suspect that
the information is material, then you are not behaving
intentionally. Mere suspicion—and a “suspicion” is a subjective
belief—does not equate with fraud.
The use of the term “recklessly” raises a recurring
problem: the court failed to define the term to distinguish it
clearly from willful blindness. If we replace “recklessly” with
“acted with willful blindness,” then we have an appropriate
272 SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2013). Obus was a civil case brought by the
SEC. Id. at 279. Presumably, the government did not seek criminal charges because of the
somewhat vague proof on the mens rea elements. As noted above, this case is important for
our discussion because the elements of civil and criminal securities fraud so often overlap.
SeeMoohr, Stewart, supra note 43, at 601. The case took on a symbolic life of its own. As the
New York Times reported, “For more than 10 years, Mr. Obus has refused to settle the
lawsuit as a matter of principle, according to his lawyer. His battle with the S.E.C. is a rare
one. Most insider trading defendants settle lawsuits brought by regulators, agreeing to
forfeit ill-gotten gains and pay a fine, without admitting or denying wrongdoing.” Peter
Lattman, Appeals Court Revives Insider Trading Case Against Obus, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6,
2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/appeals-court-revives-insider-trading-case-
against-obus/. This has come a great cost to Mr. Obus: “‘This has turned into a nightmare,’
Mr. Obus, 64, says. He has run up $6 million in legal bills.” Susanne Craig, The Curious
Case of Nelson Obus, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/
04/the-curious-case-of-nelson-obus/.
273 Obus, 693 F.3d at 288 (emphasis added).
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standard on this element.274 Willful blindness equals knowledge;
knowledge equals intent.
In discussing tipper liability, the court in Obus was again
imprecise. Here, the court stated, “the tipper must know that
the information . . . is non-public and is material . . . or act with
reckless disregard of the nature of the information.”275 Here, the
court again dropped from knowledge to recklessness without
ever discussing willful blindness.
The confusion between willful blindness and recklessness
underlies much of the insider trading mens rea mess. The United
State Supreme Court recognized this significant distinction when
describing these mental states in Global-Tech.276 Acting with
mere recklessness should not be sufficient for fraud. Acting with
the purpose to defraud, or acting with actual knowledge or willful
blindness, is sufficient.
2. Purchase or Sale of a Security
The second element of insider trading is the purchase or
sale of a security. According to the analysis above, courts should
require proof that the defendant was aware that the scheme
involved a purchase or sale of a security. With a trading party,
this is of course a non-issue.
With a non-trading tipper, however, the knowledge that
the tip will likely lead to trading goes to the core Dirks
requirement that the tipper act for personal gain. Without
knowledge that the tippee plans to use the tip to the tippee’s
benefit, then the tipper has no gain either. There is no financial or
reputational benefit to the tipper, and no benefit that comes from
the giving of a valuable gift—the gift having no value unless it
leads to potential profit for the tippee.
So the question for non-trading tipper liability boils down to
this: assuming that the tippee trades on the tip, and acts with
knowledge that the information is material and nonpublic and
obtained in breach of a duty, in what circumstances can the tipper
be liable for that trade? Because the tipper has not traded, the
tipper’s liability must be for aiding and abetting the tippee’s trade;
this was the theory under which Dirks himself was charged.
Basic aiding and abetting principles require that, at a
minimum, the government prove that the aider/abettor had (1)
274 See supra Part II.A.
275 Obus, 693 F.3d at 286.
276 See supra Part II.A.
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the intent to aid and abet the principal actor;277 and (2) the intent
that the principal actor (here, the trading tippee) commit the
crime.278 So, on the first level, the tipper must intend that the
tippee trade on the information. This is common sense; the very
term “tipper” connotes the giving of information for the purpose
(or, at a minimum, with the knowledge) that the tippee will use
that information.279 And on the second level, the tipper must know
that the information is material and nonpublic and know that it
was obtained in breach of a duty; otherwise, the tipper would not
be aware that trading by the tippee would be illegal.
Courts, however, simply do not engage in careful analysis
of these mens rea elements. In United States v. Whitman,280 the
trial court’s decision on the insider trading jury instructions is
emblematic of courts’ confusion surrounding the mens rea of tipper
liability.281 Whitman was the principal of two securities firms who
was charged as a second-level tippee. Corporate insiders tipped
intermediaries (the first level tippees), who themselves tipped
Whitman.282 The government brought Whitman under the
traditional theory, based upon the original tips from corporate
insiders. After the jury convicted Whitman, the trial judge, Jed
Rakoff,283 issued an unusually detailed post-trial opinion
explaining his jury instruction on tipper-tippee liability.284
On tipper liability, the court in Whitman ignored basic
mens rea principles. On the elements of tipper liability as
277 See DRESSLER, supra note 128, § 30.05[A].
278 See id. Most courts seem to require that the aider/abettor have the purpose to
aid, though some allow conviction based upon proof of knowledge. Id. at § 30.05(B)(2).
279 See Langevoort, supra note 170, at 448 (“Dirks is describing the essence of
a tip as a communication deliberately intended to benefit both tipper and tippee by
enabling the latter’s trading. It is thus a form of conscious fiduciary disloyalty.”).
280 United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555
F. App’x. 98 (2d Cir. 2014) (Summary Order) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 135 S.
Ct. 352 (Nov. 10, 2014).
281 Id. at 372-73. See Chad Bray, Former Hedge-Fund Manager is Sentenced,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323
539804578262273492132016; Peter J. Henning, The Winning Record of Prosecutors on
Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/
the-winning-record-of-prosecutors-of-insider-trading/.
282 Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 365.
283 Judge Rakoff is a highly respected former federal prosecutor and criminal
defense attorney with substantial experience litigating complex white collar cases. See
Michael Rothfeld, No Mr. Nice Guy—Just Ask Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203733504577026422455885502. For an
analysis of Judge Rakoff ’s prominence in the field of securities law, see Ben Protess &
Matthew Goldstein, Overruled, Judge Still Left a Mark on SEC Agenda, N.Y. TIMES
(June 5, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/appeals-court-overturns-decision-
to-reject-s-e-c-citigroup-settlement/. Nonetheless, even such an expert judge does not
always get the law exactly right, as the discussion below will show.
284 Such post-trial decisions are rare, and decisions of this depth even rarer.
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aiding and abetting the tippee’s trading, the court stated that it
is sufficient if the tipper knows that the tippee “may trade on
the information.”285 These words indicate that it is sufficient if
the tipper knew that there was a risk that the tippee would
trade; this is classic recklessness language—knowing of a risk
that a social harm might come to pass. This is not an
appropriate level of mens rea for criminal tipper liability; one
cannot accidentally, under basic common law principles, have
the intent to assist another to commit a crime.286
The Second Circuit in Obus made the same error with
respect to the tipper’s mens rea. First, the court stated that the
tipper must “deliberately or recklessly” give the information to the
tippee. This language is problematic on several levels. The term
“deliberate” equates with the MPC term “purpose,” defined as
acting with the “conscious object” to engage in the proscribed
conduct or to cause the proscribed result.287 But from this high
level of mens rea, the court skipped over knowledge and dropped
down to recklessness.
Then, the court conflated basic mens rea concepts. The
Obus court noted that “[b]ecause a defendant cannot be held
liable for negligently tipping information, difficult questions may
arise when a tip is not apparently deliberate or when the alleged
tipper’s knowledge is uncertain.” True enough. But then the court
stated, “a tipper cannot avoid liability merely by demonstrating
that he did not know to a certainty that the person to whom he
gave the information would trade on it.”288 Here, the court
misstated the definition of “knowledge,” which does not require
“certainty.” Rather, “knowledge” requires proof that the actor was
“aware of a high probability” of the existence of a particular
fact.289 Building upon this misstatement of the law, the court then
concluded that the difficulty of proving “certainty” justifies a
recklessness standard, which the court applied earlier in its
opinion. Finally, to add to the confusion, the court stated that
“conscious avoidance can be sufficient to establish tipper
scienter,”290 either jettisoning the recklessness standard that the
court had earlier endorsed or conflating the concepts of
recklessness and willful blindness.
285 Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 367 (emphasis added).
286 See DRESSLER, supra note 128, § 30.05[A].
287 MODELPENALCODE § 2.02(2)(a); see alsoDUBBER, MPC, supra note 122, at 63.
288 SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 287 (2d Cir. 2012).
289 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7).
290 Obus, 693 F.3d at 287.
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For a tipper to breach a duty under Dirks, the tipper must
intend to benefit from the tip by receiving a monetary or
professional benefit or by giving a gift of valuable information. It
is nonsensical to say that one can “recklessly” expect to receive a
professional or financial benefit or can “recklessly” give a gift. To
expect to receive a benefit is consciously to expect that the reward
will occur. The very act of gift giving requires intentionality.291 To
consider a reckless or otherwise unintentional transfer as a gift is
contrary to basic legal conceptions of gift giving.292 As the Court
explained in Dirks, a gift of valuable information by an insider to
a trading recipient resembles an inside trader transferring the
profits to the recipient.293 As later cases have noted, a gift of
information might be based upon the expectation of a future quid
pro quo.294 Or, the giving of the gift might provide emotional or
other benefits to the tipper, as in the common scenario when
tippers provide information to family members.295
It makes little sense, then, to attach recklessness to the
trading element of insider trading. A non-trading tipper who acts
for personal benefit will, in most cases, be acting with the specific
intent or purpose to give a valuable gift to the tippee. Perhaps, in
some cases, knowledge should be sufficient. But that tip must be
intentional, under any plausible reading of the Dirks rule.
3. Breach of Duty
The third actus reus element of any insider trading case is
the breach of duty. In the context of tipper/tippee liability, recent
291 In an article challenging the lack of enforceability of donative promises from
the perspective of law and emotions, Professor Hila Keren demonstrates that altruistic
behavior can be explained by a person consciously seeking a self-interested reward and/or
emotional benefits. Hila Keren, A Considering Affective Consideration, 40 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 165, 192-93 (2010).
292 The Restatement (Third) of Property defines a gift as a transfer that requires
donative intent, labeling this intent as a gift’s essence and critical to distinguishing a gift
from an involuntary transfer. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 6.1 cmt. b (2003); see also
Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 348 (1979) (arguing that selective giving of
information is the equivalent of selling the information to the recipient for cash resulting in
personal gains to tipper).
293 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (“The tip and trade resemble trading by the
insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”). Cf. United States v.
Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941, 948 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (“Given the parties’ relative stations
in life, any reputational benefit to [the tipper] is extremely unlikely to have translated
into any meaningful future advantage.”).
294 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 (“[T]here may be a relationship between the insider
and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit
the particular recipient.”).
295 See SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1998).
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cases from the Second Circuit illustrate the courts’ fundamental
confusion over the mens rea that attaches to this element. Of
course, a tipper must intentionally breach a duty to the source of
the information, as required by Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan.
The lack of clarity arises with respect to the tippee’s mens rea.
The cases raise two issues with respect to tippees that the
appeals court and, ultimately, the Supreme Court, will need to
resolve. First, in a case against a tippee, must the government
prove any mens rea with respect to the tipper’s breach of duty?
Second, assuming that some proof of the tippee’s mens rea is
required as to the tipper’s breach of duty, what is the appropriate
level of mens rea? Should recklessness, or even negligence,
suffice? Some trial courts have held that the government need
prove no mens rea on the tippee’s part with respect to the tipper’s
breach of duty, effectively imposing strict liability on this prong of
tippee liability.296 This holding rests on a plain misunderstanding
of insider trading law.
Insider trading is, according to the Supreme Court, a form
of common law fraud.297 Fraud requires intent; the fraud in insider
trading is upon the source of the information.298 Under Dirks, the
tippee cannot be liable unless the tipper breached a duty; a tipper
breaches a duty by disclosing confidential information without
authorization in a manner designed to benefit the tipper. Although
courts sometimes dispense with mens rea requirements as to
certain elements of crimes, they generally do not do so when the
element goes to a core culpability requirement.299 That is true
here, where a tippee who is not aware that the tipper obtained the
information wrongfully—and Dirks defines wrongfulness as
acting for personal gain—is not aware of the breach of duty
element that is at the core of the offense.
296 See Anello & Albert, Resolve, supra note 5, and cases discussed therein.
Although courts do sometimes fail to require proof of a mens rea for all elements of crimes,
such failure is usually limited to elements that do not go to the core culpability of the
offense. See Brown, supra note 33, at 114 (“[W]hether mens rea attaches to [an element of a
crime] is a question of culpability’s relation to the gravity of punishment”.).
297 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-30 (1980).
298 See Brown, supra note 33, at 113 (“[S]tatutory crimes based in common-law
offenses are presumed to carry common-law culpability requirements even when the
statute includes no such term.”).
299 See id. at 110-11 (describing courts’ approaches to assigning mens rea
elements as either “proportionate culpability” or “threshold culpability.”) Under either
approach, a tippee should not be liable if the tippee had no culpability with respect to
the breach of duty—the core harm from the offense. See id.; Stephen F. Smith, Essay,
Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 127-28 (2009) (Mens rea doctrine
should “ensure that the acts which lead to criminal liability will be sufficiently
blameworthy to deserve the sanctions imposed by the substantive offense.”).
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Therefore, some level of mens rea on the tippee’s part is
required. But what level? Confusion on this question arises largely
because of the Supreme Court’s sloppy mens rea language inDirks.
In its holding, the Court set forth two prongs of tippee mens rea.
First, in a straightforward holding, the Court stated that the
tippee must know that the tipped information was material and
nonpublic.300 Second, in the vexing part of the opinion, the Court
stated that there must also be proof that “the tippee knows or
should know that there has been a breach [by the tipper].”301
The Court cannot have meant that “should know” would
be sufficient. “Should know” is an objective standard that requires
that a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have
known of the breach. This is classic negligence language,302 and
the Court had previously held in Hochfelder that negligence is not
sufficient for securities fraud.303
Given the common understanding of securities fraud as
an intentional crime, the only rational explanation of the
Court’s use of this language was that it was being sloppy. As
the Court made abundantly clear in Chiarella, Dirks, and
O’Hagan, the core harm in insider trading is the breach of
duty. To say that the tippee could be liable because the tippee
was merely negligent as to the tipper’s breach of duty flies in
the face of (1) the Court’s holding that concepts of recklessness
and negligence have no place in complex business crimes such
as price-fixing (and, we can infer, a similarly complex and ill-
defined crime such as insider trading),304 (2) the Court’s holding
that negligence is not an appropriate standard even in a civil
securities fraud case,305 and (3) the willfulness requirement in
criminal securities fraud cases.
It is easy to imagine a negligent tippee who is not
sufficiently culpable to incur fraud liability. Take a barber who
has a long-time client.306 That client works for a publicly traded
company, and regularly discusses his work while having his hair
cut. One day the client mentions that the company may soon be
taken over. Based on this information, the barber trades and nets
a profit. Let us assume for a moment that the client intended this
300 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 (“knowingly receiv[ing] material nonpublic information”
is only the first prong required for proving liability).
301 Id. at 660.
302 SeeMODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d); DUBBER, MPC, supra note 122.
303 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214.
304 See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444 (1978).
305 See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 198-99.
306 This discussion is loosely based on SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941
(S.D. Ohio 2004).
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information to be a gift to the barber, and therefore breached a
duty. But should the barber go to jail for this trade? Did the
barber have actual knowledge of the breach, or was the barber
actually aware of this possibility but decided to turn a blind eye?
These would be subjective tests that would more accurately
match culpability with liability; the barber’s mental state would
evidence some intentionality. Suppose that, instead, we ask the
jury to inquire whether the barber, if he had been a reasonable
person, would have been aware of the breach; not “was he
aware” but “should he have been aware?” It would be far easier
to impose liability under the latter standard. And this barber’s
mental state does not seem sufficiently culpable to conclude
that he is a criminal fraudster.307
Courts seldom get this right, as the Whitman decision
shows. The court initially described the personal benefit
element for tippee liability quite clearly and accurately:
[I]f the only way to know whether the tipper is violating the law is to
know whether the tipper is anticipating something in return for the
unauthorized disclosure, then the tippee must have knowledge that
such self-dealing occurred, for, without such a knowledge requirement,
the tippee does not know if there has been an ‘improper’ disclosure of
inside information.308
The court continued, “On the other hand, there is no reason to
require that the tippee know the details of the benefit provided;
it is sufficient if he understands that some benefit, however
modest, is being provided in return for the information.”309 By
using the subjective term “understands,” the court effectively
held that the tippee must know that the tipper intended to
benefit by transferring the information.
So far, so good. The court continued, however, to so water
down the knowledge requirement as to render it almost
meaningless. The court instructed the jury that “[a]s to the
defendant’s knowledge that the insider has breached the insider’s
duty of trust and confidentiality in return for some actual or
anticipated benefit, . . . it is sufficient that the defendant had a
general understanding that the insider was improperly disclosing
inside information for personal benefit.”310 What does “a general
307 Cf. United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 569 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[I]nsider trading
does not necessarily involve deception, and it is easy to imagine an insider trader who
receives a tip and is unaware that his conduct was illegal and therefore wrongful.”).
308 United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(emphasis added).
309 Id.
310 Id. (emphasis added).
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understanding” mean? This sounds perilously close to
recklessness, under which a defendant need only be aware of a
risk that the tipper was acting for personal benefit. That is the
mens rea of accidental behavior, and is not fraud.
Take, for example, two long-time friends who often meet
over drinks and discuss their work and personal lives. One tells
the other, “You know, the latest financials scare me. My
company’s not doing so well, and I’m afraid I might lose my job.”
There is no evidence that the insider expected, or even suspected,
that the friend would trade on the information. The friend
promptly sells shares in the company’s stock and avoids
substantial losses. Would the “tippee” have a “general
understanding” that the “tipper” was acting for personal benefit?
Is it not a personal benefit to be able to share sorrows and
concerns with a friend? Perhaps, but that is not the sort of benefit
that Dirks described: a financial or reputational benefit to the
tipper, or the giving of a valuable gift.
If, instead, the government could show that (1) the
tipper knew that the tippee held stock in his company, (2) the
tipper intended or expected that the tippee use the information,
and (3) the tippee was aware of the tipper’s motive, then both
parties are culpable. Absent such proof, they are not. Yet, they
could be liable under theWhitman standard, under which “very
little in the way of ‘benefit’ needed to be shown.”311
Rather, as Newman held, proof of a precise benefit should
be required. Either a clear financial benefit or, at a minimum,
“proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates
an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable
nature.”312 A higher level of proof would not handicap the
government, because in the vast majority of tipper-tippee cases
the intent to benefit is apparent.
On the issue of the tippee’s mental state as to the breach,
the court in Obus erred even more egregiously than the court in
Whitman. Initially, the court in Obus correctly noted that Dirks’
“should know” language “sounds somewhat similar to a negligence
standard” and therefore conflicts with Hochfelder’s holding that
negligence is not an appropriate level of scienter for securities
fraud.313 Somewhat nonsensically, the court attempted to explain
311 Id.
312 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014); see supra note
107, and accompanying text.
313 SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 288 (2d Cir. 2012). Actually, the Dirks standard is
not “somewhat similar” to a negligence standard; it is a negligence standard. See id. (citing
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why the Dirks “should know” language is nonetheless appropriate
by noting that this language only goes to the tippee’s state of
mind concerning the tipper’s breach of duty.314 Purporting
simply to restate the negligence standard that the Supreme
Court (mis)articulated in Dirks, the court in Obus concluded,
“[t]hus, tippee liability can be established if a tippee knew or
had reason to know that confidential information was initially
obtained and transmitted improperly (and thus through
deception) . . . .”315
Again, the court conflated mens rea concepts. The court
said that it was applying negligence—an objective, reasonable
person standard—but then required that the tippee subjectively
“had reason to know” of the breach. If the tippee actually “had
reason to know” that the tipper was breaching a duty, then in all
likelihood the tippee was acting either with actual knowledge or
willful blindness.
The Obus court also plainly misstated the law with respect
to the tipper’s mens rea on the breach of duty element. The court
stated that the tipper “must know [read: have actual knowledge]
or be reckless in not knowing [read: act with recklessness] that to
disseminate the information would violate a fiduciary duty.”316 It
is the breach of duty that forms the essence of the offense, and it
is nonsensical to talk of a reckless breach of duty in the context of
insider trading. Indeed, the very next sentence in the court’s
opinion contradicts the language above: “While the tipper need
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3, cmt. g (2010)) (“Negligence requires foreseeability,
which ‘concerns what the actor “should have known.”’”).
314 The court’s analysis is so convoluted that it cannot really even be paraphrased
in a way that makes sense. Here is the entire excerpt:
We think the best way to reconcile Dirks and Hochfelder in a tipping
situation is to recognize that the two cases were not discussing the same
knowledge requirement when they announced apparently conflicting scienter
standards. Dirks’ knows or should know standard pertains to a tippee’s
knowledge that the tipper breached a duty, either to his corporation’s
shareholders (under the classical theory) or to his principal (under the
misappropriation theory), by relaying confidential information. This is a fact-
specific inquiry turning on the tippee’s own knowledge and sophistication and
on whether the tipper’s conduct raised red flags that confidential information
was being transmitted improperly.
Obus, 693 F.3d at 288. In the second sentence, the court did not even attempt to
explain why negligence should suffice on the second level of scienter. See Heminway,
supra note 87, at 52 (“If the Ernst & Ernst opinion is to retain its original meaning,
Obus cannot be right [in employing a negligence standard].”); Vissichelli, supra note
74, at 776 (noting that Obus’s application of a negligence standard is “contrary to
insider trading liability’s foundation in common law fraud.”).
315 Obus, 693 F.3d at 288 (emphasis added).
316 Id. at 286.
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not have specific knowledge of the legal nature of a breach of
fiduciary duty, he must understand that tipping the information
would be violating a confidence.”317 An actual understanding—
knowledge—that the tipper is violating a duty of confidentiality is
precisely the correct standard. This standard cannot be met if the
tipper is reckless—simply aware of some risk—that the tip
constitutes a breach of the confidentiality duty.318
In its 2013 decision in Goffer,319 the Second Circuit
continued to employ sloppy mens rea language, but at least got
the substance on the tipper’s knowledge of the breach of duty
right. In its decision, the Second Circuit affirmed the defendants’
convictions in a wide-ranging and complex criminal insider
trading conspiracy. The material nonpublic information came
from two junior attorneys at a New York law firm who tipped
others who in turn tipped additional co-conspirators.320
On appeal, a tippee challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence as to his mental state concerning the breach of duty. In
affirming the conviction, the court first quoted the Dirks “should
know” language.321 Shortly thereafter, though, the court stated
that “we find ample support for the jury to conclude that [the
tippee] was tipped by [the tipper] and knew or consciously avoided
knowing that [tipper’s] tip . . . was based on nonpublic
information illegally disclosed in breach of a fiduciary duty.”322
Although the court regrettably did not point out the inconsistency
between Dirks and the standard it applied, the court ultimately
got the substance of the rule exactly right.
In sum, the Whitman, Obus, and Goffer decisions suffer
from a fundamental lack of clarity and precision; Newman
mostly got it right, but with some muddled mens rea language
along the way. In Whitman, the court seemed to apply a
recklessness standard for tippee liability, and misconstrued the
Dirks breach of duty element. In Obus, the court repeatedly
confused and conflated mens rea concepts. It used the terms
“recklessness” and “negligence” at various points to mean that
the defendant “had reason to know” the facts constituting a
particular element. And the court threw in willful blindness
317 Id.
318 Id. at 287 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 & n.12);
see also SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1277-78 (holding that violation of § 10(b) requires
tipper act with expectation and goal of benefitting personally and reckless disclosure
“itself is insufficient to constitute a breach” for insider trading liability).
319 United States v. Goffer, 721 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2013).
320 Id. at 119.
321 Id. at 124 (quoting Obus, 693 F.3d at 124).
322 Id. at 125.
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(termed “conscious avoidance”) seemingly as a lower level of
mens rea compared to recklessness. In Goffer, the court stated
that it was applying negligence, but then defined negligence to
require knowledge.323 And even the Newman decision, which
made such great strides in clarifying mens rea standards for
tippees, conflated constructive knowledge and negligence.324 All
this imprecision is enough to give a law professor a headache,
much like reading a bad exam answer.325
Employing such confused and confusing mens rea
standards has the potential to inflict significant damage. Potential
defendants will have difficulty drawing the line between “socially
acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct”326 and
conduct that may give rise to securities fraud liability. And
prosecutors will be tempted to push the boundaries of “gray
zone” cases so as to expand the scope of criminal behavior into
unchartered territory.
Because of this state of affairs, courts should, at a
minimum, adopt clearer mens rea standards in insider trading
cases in particular and in securities fraud cases in general. And
an even better result would be for Congress to address the
problem by enacting a far more precise—and carefully graded—
insider trading statute.327 In the absence of Congressional action,
323 See supra notes 319-20 and accompanying text.
324 See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
325 At the end of the day, though, it is difficult to know whether the errors
affected the outcomes. In Whitman and Goffer, there did seem to be substantial evidence
from which a jury could find tipper/tippee liability under the appropriate standards of
intentional crimes. The court in Obus found sufficient allegations on summary judgment
for the case to go to trial. It does seem as though a jury could find that Strickland
intended to benefit by giving the information to his friend, Black, and that Black intended
to benefit professionally by tipping his boss. The only problematic part of the court’s
concluding analysis is its rejection of GE Capital’s internal finding that Strickland had
not breached a duty; it was this internal finding that led the district court to dismiss the
insider trading theory based upon misappropriation. SEC v. Obus, No. 06 CIV 3150 GBD,
2010 WL 3703846, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010). The Second Circuit reasoned that
“the GE investigation was motivated by corporate interests that may or may not coincide
with the public interest in unearthing wrongdoing and affording a remedy.” Obus, 693
F.3d at 291. This is a somewhat glib conclusion, given the policy that underlies the
misappropriation theory. This theory is based upon a breach of duty to the owner of the
information. If GE Capital had told Strickland that it would be fine for him to give the
information to his friend Black, and that it would be fine for Black to give the information
to Obus, then there would have been no breach of duty and no tipper misappropriation. If
GE Capital concluded after the fact that Strickland did not breach, then surely that
finding merits more discussion than the Second Circuit gave it.
326 United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 (1978).
327 It is unlikely that Congress would amend the securities fraud statutes so as to
narrow the scope of liability. SeeMoohr, Playing, supra note 25, at 689 (“Although Congress
usually has constitutional authority to enact corrective legislation, legislators seem more
likely to do so when judicial interpretation has narrowed, rather than broadened, the scope
of a criminal law.”). Indeed, bills introduced in the wake of Newman would substantially
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a newly systemized set of jury instructions is the best solution to
the problem.
B. Proposed Jury Instructions
What can we glean from the preceding discussion? First,
that insider trading cannot be based upon levels of mens rea that
equate with accidents; rather, this is an intentional offense.
Second, based upon MPC methodology, we should carefully parse
the elements and be precise about the level of mens rea that
attaches to each. Each actus reus component should require proof
of intentional behavior, defined in MPC terms as acting with
purpose or knowledge.
Insider/Misappropriator Liability
With respect to a principal actor who takes material
nonpublic information as an insider or misappropriator and then
trades on the information, the intentionality requirement is
straightforward. The actor knowingly possesses the information,
and trades on it without disclosing the theft to the party to
whom the actor owes a duty. The intent to harm is inherent, per
the Carpenter decision; the actor is breaching a duty by engaging
in self-dealing without disclosure, and intends to benefit from
that breach.
Based upon the analysis in Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan,
and employing MPC definitions, courts should instruct juries that
the government must prove the following elements in an insider
trading case against an alleged insider or misappropriator who
has traded securities:
broaden insider trading liability. See Tricchinelli, supra note 115. In other contexts,
Congress has enacted statutes that grade culpability by the defendant’s level of mens rea.
The computer fraud statute does this in some detail. See STRADER, UNDERSTANDING, supra
note 53, at 130-31. The proposed insider trading legislation does not engage in a careful
application of mens rea standards. See supra note 115.
328 For a discussion of the “use” vs. “possession” standards, see supra note 261.
Actus Reus Mens Rea
1) Conduct: The defendant
possessed the information.
Knowledge: The defendant was
aware of the information.328
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This instruction builds upon existing law for principals—
insiders and misappropriators—who allegedly traded on inside
information by themselves breaching a fiduciary duty. It clarifies
the law by making explicit that knowledge (including constructive
knowledge in a case where such an instruction is warranted) is
required for each of the circumstance elements: (1) the material,
non-public nature of the information; and (2) the breach of duty.
Tipper/Tippee Liability
The elements are more complex in a tipper-tippee case.
Again, it is critical to focus on the nature of the wrongdoing. As
shown above, under the traditional and misappropriation
theories, the tipper’s culpability is based upon the breach of duty.
And under Dirks, the tipper only breaches a duty if the tipper is
acting for personal benefit. As Newman held, for a breach of duty
to arise from theft of information, whether from the corporation
under the traditional theory or from another owner of the
information under the misappropriation theory, the tipper must
somehow intend to gain from use of the information.332 Just as the
Dirks insiders were whistleblowers who did not intend to benefit
329 See supra Part III.A.
330 The defendant must be generally aware of the breach of duty. See, e.g.,
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1033 (2d Cir. 1986), aff’d by an equally
divided court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
331 See supra Part II.B.2.
332 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 451-52 (2d Cir. 2014).
2) Circumstance A: The
information was material
and nonpublic.
Knowledge: The defendant was
aware that the information was
material and nonpublic.329
3) Circumstance B: The
defendant’s act of obtaining
and trading on the
information breached a
fiduciary duty.
Knowledge: The defendant was
aware that obtaining and
trading on the information
constituted a breach of a duty
of confidentiality.330
4) Conduct: The defendant
bought or sold securities.
Purpose: The defendant’s
conscious objective was to trade
on the information.
Willfulness (in a criminal case):
The defendant acted with
knowledge that the trading was
wrongful.331
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from the tip, so could an outside party reveal information without
intending to benefit.333 For example, a stock broker who believes
that the broker’s firm is trading on inside information and reveals
the information to a third party in order to blow the whistle is no
different from Dirks.
Based upon these principles, in a case against a tipper, the
government must prove that the tipper knowingly gave material,
nonpublic information to the tippee, and acted with the requisite
levels of mens rea:
Tipper Liability
Actus reus Mens rea
1) Conduct: The defendant
possessed the information.
Knowledge: The defendant
was aware of the
information.
2) Circumstance A: The
information was material
and nonpublic.
Knowledge: The defendant
was aware that the
information was material
and nonpublic.
3) Conduct: The defendant
transmitted the information
for use by the tippee.
Knowledge: The defendant
was aware that the tippee
would likely trade on the
information.
4) Circumstance B:
Transmitting the
information would violate a
duty owed to the source.
Knowledge: The defendant
knew that transmitting the
information to the tippee
would produce a personal
benefit to the tipper and
thereby violate the duty that
the defendant owed to the
information’s source.
Willfulness (in a criminal
case): The defendant acted
with knowledge that the
trading was wrongful.334
333 See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that there was no breach of duty where husband disclosed sale of company to
wife so that she could prepare to sell her share); SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 761
(W.D. Okla. 1984) (holding that there was no breach of duty where husband disclosed
inside information to wife in connection with family travel).
334 See supra Part II.A.
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For tippee liability, the government must show that the
tippee knowingly possessed material nonpublic information,
traded on that information, and knew that the information was
obtained illegally. The last element requires knowledge of a
breach of fiduciary duty as defined by Dirks—knowledge that the
tipper took the information from the source without permission
and acted for an improper purpose, that is, for personal gain:
Tippee Liability
Actus reus Mens rea
1) Conduct: The defendant
possessed the information.
Knowledge: The defendant
was aware of the information.
2) Circumstance A: The
information was material
and nonpublic.
Knowledge: The defendant
was aware that the
information was material and
nonpublic.
3) Circumstance B: The
tipper’s transmission of the
information violated a duty
owed to the source.
Knowledge: The defendant
was aware that the tipper
intended to benefit by
transmitting the tip and
thereby violated a duty to the
source.
4) Circumstance C: The
tipper transmitted the
information for use by the
tippee.
Knowledge: The defendant
was aware that the tipper
transmitted the information
for likely use by the tippee.
5) Conduct: The defendant
bought or sold securities.
Purpose: The defendant’s
conscious object was to trade
on the information.
Willfulness (in a criminal
case): The defendant acted
with knowledge that the
trading was wrongful.335
As the Second Circuit noted during oral argument in the
Newman case, it is critical that the law provide market
participants with clear guidance on the scope of insider trading
335 See supra Part II.A.
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liability.336 The possible scenarios run the gamut from the
clearly illegal to the clearly innocent: from the tippee paying off
the tipper to receive information to the friend who learns
during a casual conversation that a friend’s employer has
financial problems and then trades on the information without
knowing that the information is nonpublic or that the friend
provided this information as a gift. Only by establishing clear
standards on the mens rea required for tippers and tippees can
we provide fair notice to those thousands of people who trade
securities based upon a vast array of information as to when
that trading crosses the line.
To return to the Newman decision, the Second Circuit
seemed well aware of the policy implications of its decision. The
court was concerned with providing notice of the boundaries of
the law.337 The court was also highly aware of the mechanics of
the stock market, which operates effectively only if material
information is made available to market participants.338 Thus,
the court reiterated the essential insights of Dirks and
Chiarella: that it is the job of market analysts to ferret out hard-
to-obtain information,339 and that, as a result of this reality,
equality of information among all market participants is neither
required nor realistic.340
336 See Hurtado & Wilhelm, supra note 17, and accompanying text (quoting
Judge Barrington D. Parker Jr.).
337 Id.
338 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 451-52 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The policy
rationale [for prohibiting insider trading] stops well short of prohibiting all trading on
material nonpublic information. Efficient capital markets depend on the protection of
property rights in information. However, they also require that persons who acquire
and act on information about companies be able to profit from the information they
generate . . . .”(quoting United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d Cir. 1991)
(Winter, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)).
339 As the Court stated in Dirks v. SEC,
[i]mposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly
receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could
have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC
itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. It is
commonplace for analysts to ‘ferret out and analyze information,’ and this often
is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others who are
insiders. And information that the analysts obtain normally may be the basis
for judgments as to the market worth of a corporation’s securities. The analyst’s
judgment in this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to
clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of the
markets themselves, that such information cannot be made simultaneously
available to all of the corporation’s stockholders or the public generally.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983) (internal citation omitted).
340 As the Court stated in Chiarella, “not every instance of financial unfairness
constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b).” Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
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The Newman defendants, the court seemed to say, were
convicted and sentenced to lengthy jail terms for doing their
jobs. Under the jury instructions outlined above, they lacked the
knowledge that the original tippers breached a duty by acting
for personal gain: the essential Dirks requirement. In Obus, on
the other hand, the facts alleged by the SEC could theoretically
have led a jury to believe that (1) the original tipper, Strickland,
and the original tippee, Black, had a “meaningfully close
personal relationship” to support a conclusion that Strickland
was operating for personal gain when tipping Black, (2) Black
was acting for personal (professional) gain when tipping Obus,
and (3) Obus, the trading tippee, was aware of Strickland’s
breach. Obus, unlike Newman and Chiasson, knew both the
identity of the original tipper and the relationship between the
tipper and the intermediary.341
In any insider trading case, and especially in a
tipper/tippee case, coherent and systematic jury instructions are
essential to conceptualizing the offense in a way that conforms to
principles of the underlying doctrine. Such instructions would
require that prosecutors be more careful when charging insider
trading. The instructions would also provide much-needed clarity
to market participants who must distinguish between legal and
illegal behavior.
CONCLUSION
Insider trading law raises concerns endemic to white
collar criminalization: due process vagueness and the concurrent
risk of overcriminalization. The decisions in Whitman and Obus
cast a harsh light on courts’ tendency to misdefine and conflate
mens rea terms. By emphasizing that insider trading is a form of
fraud, and that fraud is a form of intentional behavior, courts can
begin to remedy the problem.
This reform requires, as a first principle, a focus on the
breach of duty that is the core wrong of insider trading cases. The
Newman decision takes a substantial step in that direction by
232 (1980). “[N]either the Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parity-of-
information rule.” Id. at 233.
341 However, the jury found Obus and his co-defendants not liable, apparently
because the jury did not believe that the insider passed material nonpublic information
to the tippees. See Max Stendahl, SEC Loses Latest Trial to Hedge Fund Boss, LAW360
(May 30, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/543114/sec-loses-latest-trial-
to-hedge-fund-boss-obus (“[T]he jury ruled that Strickland did not pass material, inside
information to Black; that Black did not pass an illegal tip to Obus; and that Obus did
not violate the law by purchasing SunSource stock.”).
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requiring clear intentionality on the part of both tippers and
tippees. In a perfect world, Congress would undertake the task as
a matter of legislation rather than court-created criminalization.
Whatever the solution, the current state of the law is, quite
frankly, an embarrassment that should not be allowed to endure.
